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THE THREE FACES OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY: 
REFLECTIONS ON GOVERNMENT 
APPEALS OF CRIMINAL SENTENCES 
Peter Westen* 
"O'Reilly was on trial for grand larceny. The jury returned and 
the foreman announced, Wot guilty.' 
" 'Wondeiful,' O'Reilly exclaimed 'Does that mean I can keep 
the money?' "t 
Every now and then a case ·comes along that tests the fundamen-
tal premises of a body oflaw. United States v. DiFrancesco 1 presents 
such a test to the law of double jeopardy, raising the question 
whether the government may unilaterally appeal a defendant's crim-
inal sentence for the purpose of increasing the sentence.2 The ques-
tion cannot be answered by facile reference to the text of the fifth 
amendment, because the terms of the double jeopardy clause are not 
self-defining. Nor can it be settled by reference to history, because 
the issue has not arisen with any frequency until now.3 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1964, Harvard University; J.D. 1968, 
University of California, Berkeley. - Ed. 
t What's So Funny?, PSYCH. TODAY, June, 1978, at 104. 
l. 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1012 (1980). 
2. See note 157 infra. 
3. Although several states allow the prosecution to cross-appeal a defendant's sentence for 
the purpose of seeking an increase on appeal in response to a defendant's prior appeal of 
sentence, no state permits the prosecution to initiate an appeal of sentence for the purpose of 
seeking an increase on appeal. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF 
SENTENCES § 3.4, at 55 (Approved Draft, 1968); Note, Twice in Jeopardy: Prosecutorial Appeals 
of Sentences, 63 VA. L. REV. 325, 325-26 n.4 (1977). Massachusetts and Maine have identical 
statutes which appear to permit the prosecution to initiate an appeal of sentence for the pur-
pose of seeking an increase, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 28B (Michie/Law. Co-op 1980), Me. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2142 (1980), but the Massachusetts statute has been construed to 
mean that the prosecution may not appeal except in response to a defendant's prior appeal. 
Walsh v. Picard, 446 F.2d 1209, 1211 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 921 (1972). The 
Maine statute is presumably to be construed in the same fashion, particularly in light of the 
position taken by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit that any other read-
ing of the statute would be unconstitutional. See Walsh v. Picard, 446 F.2d at 1211. The 
federal government authorizes the prosecution to initiate an appeal of sentence only with re-
spect to the relatively infrequent prosecution of dangerous special offenders such as the de-
fendant in United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 
1012 (1980), and even there only since 1970. See 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (Supp. 1980), as noted in S. 
REP. No. 96-553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1137 n.17 (1980), and 21 U.S.C. § 849(h) (1972) (a 
statutory provision almost identical to § 3576). It is no accident that the unique provision for 
government appeal of sentences in§ 3576 (and in its twin, 21 U.S.C. § 849(h)) is so recent. It is 
only recently that Congress has authorized the government to take expanded appeals of any 
kind in criminal cases. For a statutory history of the federal government's authority to take 
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Moreover, although the issue has been lurking about for over a 
century, 4 it finds no authoritative resolution in the vast jurisprudence 
of double jeopardy. The reason for this is that the Supreme Court's 
decisions are ambivalent. On the one hand, the Court has said in 
dictum that "to increase [a defendant's] penalty is to subject the de-
fendant to double punishment for the same offense in violation of 
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution."5 On the other hand, the 
Court has held that a court may incr,ease a defendant's sentence in 
consequence of an appeal if the defendant himself initiates the ap-
peal. 6 To decide which line of cases is authoritative, one cannot rely 
exclusively on either one; initially, one must put them both aside and 
seek the answer in the fundamentals of double jeopardy. Thus, to 
decide whether the Court's earlier dictum should now be invoked in 
a case in which it would become a holding, one must decide whether 
the dictum is a sound reflection of the values inherent in the double 
jeopardy clause; similarly, to decide whether the Court's earlier 
holding should now be followed in a case in which the defendant 
himself is not taking an appeal, one must decide whether the pres-
ence or absence of an appeal by a defendant is significant in light of 
the purposes of double jeopardy. 
This search for controlling values is necessary in every constitu-
tional area, but it is especially important, and difficult, in the area of 
double jeopardy. For unlike other constitutional provisions, the 
double jeopardy clause is a triptych of three separate values: (I) the 
integrity of jury verdicts of not guilty, (2) the lawful administration 
of prescribed sentences, and (3) the interest in repose. Each value is 
entirely distinct from and theoretically independent of the others, all 
appeals in criminal cases, see United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336-39 (1975) (describing 
the history of title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, now in effect as 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3731 (Supp. 1980); United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 307-08 (1970) (describing the statu• 
tory history of the predecessor statutes to § 3731). As a result, the problem of government-
initiated requests for increases in sentence could not arise before 1970 except in the context of 
a government request to the trial court (as opposed to an appellate court) for a reconsideration 
of sentence, e.g., Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160 (1947), or a government petition to an 
appellate court for writ of mandamus (as opposed to an appeal) for the correction of an illegal 
sentence, e.g., United States v. Denson, 603 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1979). 
4. See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1873) (dictum}, later taken as authority 
for the proposition that a trial court has no constitutional authority under the double jeopardy 
clause to increase a defendant's sentence at the government's request, United States v. Benz, 
282 U.S. 304,307 (1931). For a fuller discussion of Lange, see text accompanying notes 165-69 
infta. 
5. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304,307 (1931). The foregoing statement from Benz was 
dictum because the actual issue in Benz was not whether a trial court may increase a defend-
ant's sentence at the government's request, but whether it may reduce a defendant's sentence at 
his request. 
6. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 719-21 (1969). 
•. 
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being related to one another only by the "rubric"7 of the double 
jeopardy clause.8 To solve the problem of government appeals of 
criminal sentences - indeed, to solve any difficult problem of 
double jeopardy - one must identify the three values and match 
them to their respective weights, taking care not to use examples of 
one as authority for another.9 The foregoing approach not only 
promises to bring coherence to the jurisprudence of double jeopardy, 
but also works to transform complex cases into simple ones. 
This tripartite approach to double jeopardy is particularly useful 
for the .DiFrancesco problem of government appeals of criminal 
sentences. As we shall see, two of the three values of double jeop-
ardy tum out to be irrelevant to .DiFrancesco, while the weight of the 
third value is such as to render the resolution of .DiFrancesco nearly 
self-evident. In short, .DiFrancesco is a seemingly difficult case that 
analysis reveals to be actually rather easy. 
I. THE THREE FACES OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
Some constitutional provisions, having unitary purposes, lend 
themselves to textual analysis: one customarily begins with a phrase 
( or even a single word) from the Constitution and attempts to state 
its meaning in a manner consistent with its original purposes and 
developed jurisprudence. 10 The double jeopardy clause is not such a 
provision. The double jeopardy clause does not lend itself to easy 
textual analysis, because its words and phrases change their meaning 
depending upon which of its three purposes is-at issue. The three 
purposes are simply too distinct from one another to be usefully 
combined in any single formulation, and any effort to do so inevita-
bly results in a statement too abstract and generalized to be capable 
of resolving particular cases. 11 To avoid confusion it helps to put 
7. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 46 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
8. See Illinois v. Vitale, 100 S. Ct. 2260, 2264 (1980) ("[t]he constitutional prohibition of 
double jeopardy has been held to consist of three separate guarantees"); United States v. Scott, 
437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978) (the double jeopardy clause serves several purposes -purposes that are 
"separate" yet "related"). 
9. See Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1442 n.3 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring) (cases defining the "same" offense for purposes of successive prosecution should not be 
invoked as authority for the definition of the "same offense" for purposes of cumulative pun-
ishment). 
10. For example, the constitutional meaning of a defendant's sixth amendment right to be 
"confronted" with the "witnesses against him" can be usefully investigated by inquiring int? 
the meaning of the phrase, ''witnesses against him." See Westen, The Future of Co,!frontation, 
77 MICH. L. REV. 1185, 1187-90 (1979). 
11. Perhaps the most striking example was Justice Black's statement that the essence of 
double jeopardy is that no one should have to "run the gantlet" more than "once." Green v. 
United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957). The obvious difficulty with Justice Black's "colorful 
and graphic phrase," Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 465 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting}, is 
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aside the specific words of the fifth amendment and directly analyze 
its three underlying meanings; once its various meanings have been 
identified and separately formulated, one can then return to the orig-
inal text and make the respective connections. 12 
A. Acquittals: The .Defendant's Interest in the Integrity of Jury 
Verdicts of Not Guilty 
We begin with the rule that is said to be "fundamental"13 to the 
double jeopardy clause: the constitutional right of a defendant not 
to be further prosecuted following a jury verdict of not guilty. This 
rule is assumed to be fundamental because it is the most "abso-
lute." 14 It not only operates without exception, but also applies even 
where the jury's verdict of not guilty is wholly implicit. 15 The ques-
tion, therefore, is whether the "absolute finality" 16 of a jury verdict 
that the terms, "gantlet," "run," and "once," are no more self-defining than the original phras-
ing of the fifth amendment. Accordingly, in order to decide what these new terms mean, one 
must follow the same path one takes in deciding what the original fifth amendment phrasing 
means - "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of 
life or limb." That is, in order to decide what the words of the fifth amendment mean, one 
must first ascertain what purposes they serve. When one does, one will discover, once again, 
that the purposes are "separate,'' United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978), and, accord-
ingly, that the meanings of the constituent terms change in accord with the several purposes for 
which they are invoked. See Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1442 (1980) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) ("the meaning of this phrase ['the same offense'] may vary from context to 
context"). To be sure, one can always take the step of subsuming all three meanings under a 
general notion of procedural "fairness;" but if one does, one will discover that "fairness" states 
the issue at too high a level of generality to be of any utility in resolving actual problems. To 
resolve real problems, one will be forced once again to reduce "fairness" to its separate constit-
uent elements. 
12. Consider, for example, the fifth amendment term ''the same offense." With respect to 
whether a defendant may be tried for an offense after having already been convicted of a prior 
offense, the second offense is the "same" as the first if the second necessarily contains any 
statutorily sufficient elements in common with the first. See Illinois v. Vitale, 48 U.S.L.W. 
4741, 4742-43, 4744 (U.S. June 19, 1980) (per White, J.). With respect to whether a defendant 
may be given multiple sentences for multiple offenses following a single trial for a given course 
of conduct, one offense is not the "same" as another if the legislature explicitly intended that 
they be cumulatively punished, even though one contains elements necessarily. found in an-
other. See Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1440 (1980) (White, J., concurring). See 
also 100 S. Ct. at 1436. With respect to whether a defendant may be tried for an offense after 
having already been acquitted of a prior offense, the second offense is the "same" as the first if 
the prosecution attempts to prove any issue of fact in the second proceeding which it tried and 
failed to prove in the first, even though the legislature intended the two offenses to be cumula-
tively punishable, and even though the second offense contains no statutorily sufficient ele-
ments in common with the first. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). See generally 
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166-67 n.6 (1977). To try to formulate a single definition of 
''.same offense" for these three separate purposes would produce a statement of such abstract 
generality as to be of no usefulness in resolving actual cases. 
13. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977). 
14. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. I, 16 (1978). 
15. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957). 
16. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978). 
/ 
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of not guilty has any bearing on the authority of the government 
unilaterally to appeal for an increase in a defendant's sentence. 
To answer the foregoing question one must first identify the con-
stitutional value that underlies the jury-acquittal rule, and then de-
termine the relevance of the value to government appeal of 
sentences. Although the Supreme Court has yet to explain the jury-
acquittal rule, there appear to be three possible rationales: (1) the 
defendant's expectation of finality regarding jury verdicts of not 
guilty; (2) the jury's constitutional prerogative to find the facts; and 
(3) the jury's prerogative to acquit against the evidence. 
1. The Expectation of Finality 
The finality argument takes two separate forms - one based on 
the expectations a defendant actually has, and the other based on the 
expectations he is entitled to have. The argument from actual expec-
tations must fail, because its implications are implausible. If the 
jury-acquittal rule were based on actual expectations, jury acquittals 
would never be final unless defendants were shown actually to have 
expected them to be final; yet jury acquittals are now treated as final 
without reference to any such showing, and even without any rea-
sonable likelihood of such a showing.17 Moreover, if the jury-acquit-
tal rule were based on actual expectations, the rule could be erased 
merely by making a prospective change in people's actual expecta-
tions; yet surely it would be unconstitutional to enact a statute for the 
appeal of jury acquittals, even if the statute were made wholly pro-
spective and were applied only to defendants having notice of the 
new statute. 18 · 
17. Thus, the defendant in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), did not show and 
could not have shown that he actually relied on the finality of the jury's decision implicitly to 
acquit him of first degree murder, because at the time he was tried, the prevailing rule in the 
federal courts was that an implicit acquittal is not an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes 
and does not operate to immunize a defendant from being retried on the charge of which he 
was implicitly acquitted. SeeTrono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905) (distinguished if not 
altogether overruled in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. at 194-98). The Trono rule was in 
effect at the time in a majority of the states that had considered it. See Green v. United States, 
355 U.S. at 216-18 n.4 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
18. This was essentially the situation in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). The 
defendant in Benton was tried in a Maryland state court on two counts. After being explicitly 
acquitted on one and convicted on the other, he successfully challenged his conviction on the 
ground that the entire underlying indictment was invalid. Following the reversal of his convic-
tion, he was retried and convicted on both counts, a disposition which was entirely in accord 
with the longstanding law of Maryland at the time of his original trial. The defendant in 
Benton could not have actually relied on the finality of his explicit acquittal, because at the 
time he moved to set aside his original conviction, he knew that the law of Maryland then in 
effect permitted the state to retry him on the count of which he had been acquitted following 
his successful challenge to the underlying indictment. See Benton v. State, l Md. App. 647, 
650-51, 232 A.2d 541, 542-43 (1967) (collecting authorities). Nor could the defendant have 
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The stronger argument is that a defendant is entitled to an expec-
tation of finality, regardless of whether he actually has such an ex-
pectation. This argument takes several forms. A favorite form is 
that if the state is allowed to reprosecute following jury acquittals, it 
will inevitably convict innocent defendants, because it will deliber-
ately wear them down through repeated litigation, or intentionally 
persist in prosecuting them until it eventually finds a jury willing to 
convict. 19 A variation of the argument is that if the state is allowed 
to reprosecute in such cases, it will obtain an unfair advantage over 
the defendant, because it will intentionally use the first trial as a dis-
covery device for inspecting the defendant's case, or as a dry run for 
testing its own case. 20 
The trouble with these arguments is not that they are bad, but 
that they are unresponsive: they do not explain the "absolute" na-
ture of the jury-acquittal rule. If the rule were designed solely to 
protect innocent defendants, or solely to prevent the prosecution 
from using the first trial as a dry run or from shopping for a convic-
tion-prone jury, the rule would be confined to abuses of that kind. It 
would be tailored to correspond to the separate double jeopardy 
standards that now govern reprosecution following mistrials and re-
versed convictions - namely, that once jeopardy attaches, the state 
may not retry a defendant over his objection solely for the deliberate 
purpose of improving upon its case, harassing the· defendant, or 
shopping for a more favorable trier of fact.21 Instead, the jury-ac-
quittal rule sweeps far more broadly than the rules for mistrials and 
reversed convictions - and far more broadly than reasonable to 
serve the foregoing purposes22 - because it accords absolute finality 
to jury acquittals even where the prosecution is acknowledged to 
relied on the federal constitutional rule of double jeopardy to the contrary, because it was well 
understood at the time of his original trial that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amend-
ment did not apply to the states. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled in 
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1969). 
19. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957) (''The underlying idea •.. is 
that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated at• 
tempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby • . . enhancing the possibility 
that even though innocent he may be found guilty."). See also Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 
464, 474 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
20. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 105 n.4 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United 
States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970), 
21. See, e.g., United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976); United States v. Jorn, 400 
U.S. 470, 485 & n.12 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
22. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 810-13 & n.18 (1969) (Harlan, J,, dissenting) 
(the federal constitutional rule, that a defendant may never be retried following an acquillal by 
a jury, goes further than is necessary to prevent the state from reprosecuting a defendant in 
bad faith or for no legitimate reason). See also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,328 (1937), 
overruled in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
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have acted in good faith and even where the acquittals are known to 
be "egregiously erroneous."23 
The next argument builds upon the former. The real problem, so 
the argument goes, is not that the state will retry a defendant inten-
tionally to manipulate or harass, but that retrial will inevitably have 
those ejfects.24 Thus, even if an error in the original trial is acknowl-
edged not to be the fault of the prosecution, and even if the prosecu-
tion thus has a legitimate, good-faith reason for wishing to retry the 
defendant, retrial has the inevitable effect of both enabling the prose-
cution to improve upon its case and burdening the defendant with 
the onus and anxiety of further proceedings. 
Notice that this argument avoids the problem surrounding the 
first justification. The first justification was based on a set of values 
which, though sound and well-accepted, were simply too narrow to 
support the sweeping scope of the jury-acquittal rule. The second 
argument avoids that problem by invoking a rationale that is suffi-
ciently broad to support a rule of "absolute finality." The problem 
with the second argument, however, is that the value it invokes -
i.e., the absolute value in protecting defendants from the unintended 
burdens and tactical disadvantages of retrial - has been rejected by 
the Supreme Court in every other area of double jeopardy in which 
it has arisen. Thus, the Court has held that unless the state is shown 
to be retrying a defendant solely for the purpose of improving upon 
its case, shopping for a more favorable trier of fact, or harassing the 
defendant, the state may retry a defendant following pretrial fact-
finding terminating in his favor,25 following mistrials declared over 
his objection,26 mistrials declared because ofhungjuries,27 and con-
victions reversed on appeal;28 and the state may do so even though 
the state itself is partly at fault for the wrongful way in which the 
initial proceeding terminated.29 
23. Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam). 
24. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957) ("The underlying idea ... is that 
the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to 
convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense 
and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity . . ."). 
25. See, e.g., United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 (1976); Serfass v. United States, 420 
U.S. 377 (1975). 
26. See, e.g., Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973). 
27. See, e.g., Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978). 
28. See, e.g., United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). 
29. In Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973) and United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 
(1896), the prosecution was responsible for the defect in the defendant's initial trial. In United 
States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 (1976), and Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975), the 
trial judge was responsible for the. erroneous termination of the preliminary proceedings. 
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Perhaps the best example is the rule of United States v. Ba!P0 that 
a defendant, who is wrongfully convicted at his original trial because 
of prejudicial error on the part of the state, may nonetheless be re-
tried by the state following the setting aside of his conviction on ap-
peal. Ball is directly on point, because as far as the burdens and 
tactical disadvantages of retrial are concerned, a defendant who is 
retried following an erroneous conviction is in precisely the same 
position as a defendant who is retried following an erroneous acquit-
tal. Each defendant has already gone through one full trial; each of 
the original trials was infected with prejudicial error; each of the de-
fendants, if now retried, faces both the burdens of renewed litigation 
and the tactical disadvantage of having disclosed his case to the pros-
ecution. In short, whatever other differences may exist between re-
trial following an erroneous acquittal and retrial following an 
erroneous conviction, no differences exist regarding either litigation 
burdens on the defendant or strategic benefits to the prosecution. 
The final argument for a defendant's expectation of finality fo-
cuses on the remaining difference between an erroneous acquittal 
and an erroneous conviction. The significant difference (so the argu-
ment goes) is that while a conviction terminates a case to a defend-
ant's disadvantage, an acquittal terminates the case in his favor. 
Accordingly, the reason the double jeopardy clause affords greater 
.finality to an erroneous acquittal than to an erroneous conviction is 
to safeguard the particular feelings of relief and desire for repose 
that only an acquitted defendant enjoys. 
The foregoing argument contains several flaws. For one thing, it 
begs the question at issue by comparing the acquitted defendant to 
the convicted defendant at the wrong point in time. The relevant 
comparison is to the convicted defendant not at the time of convic-
tion, but at the time his conviction is set aside on appeal.31 At the 
point when a conviction is set aside, a defendant who has prevailed 
on appeal experiences precisely the same feelings of relief and 
desires for repose as a defendant who has just been acquitted by a 
jury. If a convicted defendant's feelings and desires do not suffice to 
outweigh the state's interest in reprosecution following a successful 
appeal, it is hard to see why an acquitted defendant's feelings would 
suffice.32 Furthermore, the argument fails to explain why a defen-
30. 163 U.S. 662 (1896). 
31. See Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 136 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[w]e 
must consider [the convicted defendant's] position at the moment when his exceptions are 
sustained (on ~appeal]. The first verdict has been set aside. The jeopardy created by that is at 
an end, and the question is what shall be done with the prisoner"). 
32. Again, it begs the question to say that a convicted defendant, who chooses to continue 
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dant's feelings of relief and desire for repose do not suffice to accord 
absolute finality to the other kinds of erroneous rulings that termi-
nate a case in his favor, such as dismissals before trial, dismissals at 
mid-trial, post-verdict judgments of acquittal, and appellate judg-
ments of acquittal. If the defendant's feelings and desires were con-
trolling, the latter rulings should confer the same kind of immunity 
from reprosecution that erroneous acquittals do. Yet they do not.33 
Accordingly, regardless of how much weight one attaches to a 
defendant's feelings of joy over a favorable outcome, there is no 
principled basis for according greater finality to an erroneous acquit-
tal than to a reversed conviction. 34 Indeed, if anything, the errone-
ously convicted defendant is the more deserving of the two 
defendants because he was the unwilling victim of an error at trial 
and, but for the error, might have been acquitted; the erroneously 
acquitted defendant was probably the perpetrator of the error and, 
but for its commission, might well have been convicted.35 
To conclude, none of the previous arguments regarding expecta-
the proceedings by pursuing an appeal, waives or relinquishes his desire for repose; it can be 
equally (and more accurately) said that he relinquishes a desire for repose only insofar as 
necessary to obtain the relief to which he is entitled, ie., an appellate court order setting aside 
his conviction for error. See Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 135 (1904) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (it cannot be said that a convicted defendant, who successfully appeals his convic-
tion, thereby ''waive[s]'' his interest in not being retried, because ''no such waiver is expressed 
or thought of'). For a discussion of the factors that underlie the fiction of waiver, see text 
accompanying notes 190-205 iefra. 
33. See, e.g., Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975) (defendant may be retried fol-
lowing an erroneous termination of a case in his favor before trial); Lee v. United States, 432 
U.S. 23 (1977) (defendant may be retried following dismissal, on defendant's motion, of defec-
tive information at mid-trial); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 270-71 (1978) (govern-
ment may appeal a trial judge's judgmt11t of acquittal for insufficiency of evidence, if the result 
of the appeal is to reinstate the trial judge's prior finding of guilty); Forman v. United States, 
361 U.S. 416,426 (1960) (government may appeal or seek certiorari from an appellate court's 
erroneous judgment of acquittal for insufficiency of evidence, if the result of the appeal is to 
reinstate a prior valid verdict of guilty). 
34. See notes 148, 221 iefra. The same is also true of erroneous rulings by judges in a 
defendant's favor in the course of jury trials. Thus, it has been suggested that when a trial 
judge makes a post-verdict ruling in a defendant's favor - however erroneous the ruling may 
be - the defendant's interest in feelings of relief and desires for repose become sufficiently 
strong to preclude the government from appealing the ruling. The Court has rejected this 
argument, holding that a defendant's interest in such repose is not legitimate if it sacrifices the 
state's interest in an error-free trial. See United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 365 (1975): 
To be sure, the defendant would prefer that the Government not be permitted to appeal 
[an erroneous ruling in his favor] or that the judgment of conviction not be entered, but 
this interest of the defendant is not one that the Double Jeopardy Clause was designed to 
protect. 
See also Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 216 (1978). 
35. The state is not attempting to wear the accused out by a multitude of cases with 
accumulated trials. It asks no more than this, that the case against him shall go on until 
there shall be a trial free from the corrosion of substantial legal error. This is not cruelty 
at all, nor even vexation in any immoderate degree. If the trial had been infected with 
error adverse to the accused, there might have been review at his instance, and as often as 
necessary to purge the vicious taint. A reciprocal privilege . • . has now been granted to 
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tions of finality are capable of explaining why the jury-acquittal rule 
is so much more "absolute" than its companion principles of double 
jeopardy. This does not mean that expectations of finality are vacu-
ous, or that a defendant's desire for repose remains entirely unpro-
tected. Finality is an important value and, as we shall see, it plays a 
crucial role in limiting the constitutional authority of the state to 
continue to prosecute defendants following mistrials, dismissals, and 
reversed convictions. The fact remains, however, that the finality 
value, though substantial, is not so powerful as to confer immunity 
on a defendant whenever an error causes a trial to terminate in his 
favor. There is an obvious reason for the reluctance to treat finality 
as an absolute value: claims for finality - like claims regarding 
preindictment delay, speedy trial, and statutes of limitation - are 
highly threatening to the legal order because they operate to confer 
blanket immunity on defendants without regard to their factual guilt 
or innocence. The greater weight that is accorded the finality value, 
the greater the frequency that factually guilty defendants will go 
free. It is not surprising, therefore, that the finality value itself is not 
absolute, and that it is always carefully balanced against "society['s] 
. valid concern for insuring that the guilty are punished."36 
2. The Jury's Prerogative To Find Facts 
The next justification for the jury-acquittal rule avoids the inher-
ent problems of finality. Claims of finality are problematical be-
cause they do not distinguish between factually innocent and 
factually guilty defendants. The instant argument, in contrast, pur-
ports to make that distinction, thus avoiding the problem of invoking 
blanket immunity on behalf of guilty and innocent defendants alike. 
The reason jury acquittals are final, so the argument goes, is that 
they represent factual findings of innocence by a body that has unre-
viewable authority to find facts. The same reason explains why ac-
quittals are different from convictions. Jury acquittals are final (and 
jury convictions are not) because jury acquittals are statements of 
actual innocence. If the state is allowed to retry defendants follow-
the state. There is here no seismic innovation. The edifice of justice stands, its symmetry, 
to many, greater than before. 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937) (citations omitted}, overruled in Benton v. Ma• 
ryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). See also Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 135 (1904) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (a defendant is "no more .•. put in jeopardy a second time when 
retried because of a mistake ... in his favor, than he [is] •.. when retried for a mistake that 
did him harm"). 
36. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. I, 15 (1978). 
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ing jury acquittals, it creates an unacceptable risk that innocent de-
fendants will be convicted. 
The foregoing argument would be perfectly sound if the jury-
acquittal rule were confined to error-free acquittals. An error-free 
acquittal is probative evidence of factual innocence; indeed, it is 
often the best such evidence known to the law. If the state were to 
retry defendants in the face of such evidence, it would be running a 
high risk of convicting factually innocent persons.37 
Unfortunately, while the innocence argument explains why er-
ror-free acquittals should be final, it does not explain the finality of 
erroneous acquittals, much less "egregiously erroneous"38 acquittals. 
An erroneous acquittal, by definition, is a verdict which is tainted to 
a material degree by some defect in the fact-finding process - per-
haps because the probative incriminating evidence was wrongfully 
excluded, or because unprobative exculpatory evidence was wrong-
fully admitted, or because the jury was wrongfully impaneled or in-
structed. As the product of faulty fact-finding, an erroneous jury 
, acquittal says nothing about a defendant's actual innocence because 
it says nothing about what an error-free process would have re-
vealed.39 Indeed, an erroneous conviction may be more probative of 
innocence than an erroneous acquittal: a defendant whose convic-
tion is set aside on appeal because of prejudicial error is always 
someone who, but for the error, could reasonably have been acquit-
ted, and he is sometimes someone who now has to be acquitted; a 
person whose acquittal is based on an error harmful to the prosecu-
tion is always someone who, but for the error, could reasonably have 
been convicted, and he is sometimes someone who would now rea-
37. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 809-13 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
38. See note 23 supra. 
39. The best analogy is to the ieventh amendment right to trial by jury in civil cases. The 
seventh amendment specifically provides that "no fact tried by a [civil) jury shall be otherwise 
examined in any court of the United States." U.S. CONST., amend. VII. Yet it is well estab-
lished that a finding of fact by a civil jury may be appealed without violating the seventh 
amendment when a party can show that the jury's findings were based on legal errors in the 
fact-finding process. See Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. I, 13 (1899). The reason for 
this is that findings of fact possess no integrity if based on defects in the fact-finding process. 
q. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 106 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (verdicts of acquit-
tal that are based on legal errors in the fact-finding process do not establish anything regarding 
the defendant's actual innocence). 
The same is true of erroneous rulings by a judge in a defendant's favor in the course of a 
jury trial. An erroneous application by a judge of the law to the facts says nothing about a 
defendant's actual innocence because it says nothing about what would have resulted from a 
correct application of the law to the facts. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 106-07 
(1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975) 
("A system permitting review of all claimed legal errors would have sy=etry to reco=end 
it and would avoid the release of some defendants who have benefited from instructions or 
evidentiary rulings that are unduly favorable to them"). 
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sonably have to be convicted.40 
3. The Jury's Prerogative To Acquit Against the Evidence 
The last justification for the absolute finality of jury acquittals, 
and the most coherent, is that the rule is a consequence of the jury's 
prerogative to acquit against the evidence. This justification differs 
from the previous one. It is based not on the jury's authority to find 
facts, but on its authority to nullify the law in individual criminal 
cases. When a jury acquits against the evidence, it is not making a 
factual determination regarding the disputed items of evidence; if 
that were so - that is, if the jury were simply resolving disputed 
issues of fact in the defendant's favor under prevailing standards of 
proof- it would be acquitting on the evidence, not against the evi-
dence. Nor can the jury be said to be faithfully applying the legal 
standard of conduct prescribed by the legislature; if the jury were 
doing so - if the evidence justified an acquittal under a faithful ap-
plication of the legislative standard of criminal conduct - the ac-
quittal, again, would be based on the evidence, not against it. To say 
that a jury acquits against the evidence means that it acts against 
what the law prescribes as the legal consequence of the facts as the 
jury knows them to be. By being lenient toward a defendant where 
the law does not prescribe lenience, the jury is exercising a species of 
legislative power. More precisely, it is exercising a veto power: the 
power to veto legislation in particular cases by fashioning a standard 
for adjudging the past conduct of particular defendants that is dis-
tinct from and more lenient than the standard prescribed by the leg-
islature. 41 
The authority of the crinµn.al jury to veto or nullify the rigor of 
40. A "prejudicial" error is a "material" error, an error which can reasonably be said to 
have had a potential effect on the outcome of trial. See Westen, Compulsory Process II, 14 
MICH. L. REV. 191, 214-20 (1975). Accordingly, a defendant whose conviction is set aside on 
appeal because of prejudicial error is necessarily someone who, but for the error, could reason-
ably have been acquitted. Moreover, a sub-class of such cases is made up of those in which the 
prejudicial error consisted of admitting evidence which is crucial to the prosecution's case 
against the defendant. In those latter cases, an appellate reversal for prejudicial error means 
that the defendant is not only someone who could reasonably have been acquitted at this 
initial trial, but someone who, if retried now, will have to be acquitted at the close of the state's 
case. 
By the same token, a defendant who is wrongfully acquitted at trial because of an error 
prejudicial to the prosecution is necessarily someone who, but for the error, might reasonably 
have been convicted. Moreover, if the error was truly crucial, the defendant may be left with 
such a weak case that if trial courts were permitted to direct verdicts against defendants in 
criminal cases, a court would have to so direct the jury. 
41. See Beck v. Alabama, 100 S. Ct. 2382, 2390 (1980) (when juries acquit against the 
evidence, they are "creat[ing] their own sentencing discretion" in place of the standards pre-
scribed by the legislature). 
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the criminal law distinguishes the sixth-amendment criminal jury 
from the seventh-amendment civil jury. Although both have invio-
late constitutional authority to find facts, the civil jury can be con-
fined to the province of fact-finding. The most common jury-control 
devices (such as directed verdicts,42 judgments notwithstanding the-
verdict,43 special verdicts,44 partial directed verdicts,45 interrogate-
42. Directed verdicts are commonly employed in civil trials, both against plaintiffs and 
against defendants. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 50. Directed verdicts are also commonly em-
ployed against the prosecution in criminal cases. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 29. Yet it is assumed 
to be unconstitutional to direct a verdict against a defendant in a criminal case. See Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 n.10 (1979); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 
564, 572-73 (1977); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. United States, 330 U.S. 
395, 408 (1947); Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105 (1895). 
The prohibition of directed verdicts against defendants in criminal cases cannot be based 
on a desire to allow the jury to find facts, because directed verdicts are only employed where 
facts are not in dispute and where any verdict to the contrary would represent nullification of 
the law. See Currie, Thoughts on .Directed Verdicts and Summary Judgments, 45 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 72 (1977). Consequently, if directed verdicts are constitutionally prohibited in criminal 
cases, it must be because the criminal jury cannot be constitutionally prevented from nullifying 
the law. 
Now it might be argued that the reason directed verdicts of guilty are prohibited in crimi-
nal cases is that they would inevitably intrude to some extent, however minor, on the jury's 
authority to find facts. When a trial judge directs a verdict, so the argument goes, he invaria-
bly makes some assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative nature of the 
evidence. Such assessments may be tolerable in civil cases, where the issues are less sensitive, 
but the sixth amendment reflects the judgment that judges are not to be trusted to make such 
assessments adversely to defendants in criminal cases. In other words, so the argument goes, 
judges are not to be trusted to say that evidence of guilt is so overwhelming that "reasonable" 
jurors would have to convict. 
There are at least two problems with the foregoing argument. First, it disregards authority 
to the effect that when a trial judge directs a verdict in a criminal case, he is not making factual 
determinations. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978). Second, even if it is true 
that directed verdicts involve some assessment of facts, the same is not true of special verdicts. 
Special verdicts do not intrude in any way upon a jury's authority to find facts; the only func-
tion special verdicts perform is to prevent the jury, once it has found the facts, from reaching a 
conclusion which is contrary to the legally mandated consequence of such facts. Yet special 
verdicts, too, are prohibited in criminal cases. See note 44 i'!fra. If special verdicts are prohib-
ited in criminal cases, it cannot be because they interfere with the jury's authority to find facts; 
it must be because they interfere with the jury's authority to render a general verdict of not 
guilty in the face of what its special findings of fact dictate. This supports the view that the 
same latter value also underlies the prohibition on directed verdicts in criminal cases. 
43. Judgments notwithstanding the verdict are common in civil cases, against both plain-
tiffs and defendants. See FED. R. Crv. P. 50. Judgments notwithstanding verdicts are also 
employed in criminal cases against the prosecution. See FED. R CRIM. P. 29(c). Yet such 
judgments, which have been called "hang-fire cousins" of directed verdicts, Cooper, .Directions 
far .Directed Verdicts: A Compass far Federal Courts, 55 MINN. L. REV. 903, 903 (1971), are 
constitutionally prohibited from being entered against an accused in a criminal case for the 
same reason that directed verdicts are prohibited. See Standefer v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 
1999, 2007 (1980); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 n.10 (1979). 
44. Special verdicts are used in civil jury trials, both against plaintiffs and against defend-
ants. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 49(a). Nor is there presumably any constitutional bar to their 
use in criminal cases at a defendant's request. Yet it is commonly assumed to be unconstitu-
tional to require a criminal jury, over a defendant's objection, to return special verdicts in 
place of a general verdict. See Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 80-81, 83, 87, 94-
95 (1895); United States v. Ogull, 149 F. Supp. 272, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), ajfd sub nom. United 
States v. Gernie, 252 F.2d 664 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 968 (1958); G. CLEMENTSON, 
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ries to accompany general verdicts,46 the ordering of new trials for 
inconsistent verdicts,47 judicial comment on the evidence,48 issue 
SPECIAL VERDICTS AND SPECIAL FINDINGS BY JURIES 49 (1905); 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE§ 512, at 365 (1969). 
The constitutional prohibition on special verdicts in criminal cases cannot be based on a 
desire to give the jury full rein to find facts, because special verdicts operate to give the jury 
just as much authority to find facts, and to apply the law to the facts, as juries enjoy under a 
general verdict procedure. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCE• 
DURE§ 2509, at 510 (1971). Indeed, as far as the jury is concerned, it has just as much author-
ity under special verdicts as under a general verdict, with one exception: not knowing the legal 
consequence of its constituent findings of fact, the jury cannot manipulate its particular find-
ings to reach a result it otherwise desires, nor can it reach an outcome that departs from the 
automatic legal consequence of the particular findings it returns. That is to say, it cannot 
nullify the law by returning a general verdict which is inconsistent with the automatic and self-
evident legal effect of its special findings. See Id. at 511-12. Thus, the sole purpose of special 
verdicts is to deny the jury the opportunity for nullifying the law that the jury would possess 
under a general-verdict procedure. See Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE 
L.J. 253, 258 (1920). Since the criminal jury is constitutionally entitled to return a general 
verdict in place of special verdicts, it must be because the criminal jury has a constitutional 
prerogative to nullify the law by returning general verdicts of not guilty in cases in which the 
jury's constituent findings of fact would dictate verdicts of guilty. 
45. Trial judges have authority to remove from a civil jury's consideration those portions 
of a case about which there is no genuine dispute. See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. 56(d). Trial 
judges presumably have constitutional power to enter such partial judgments in criminal cases, 
too, at a defendant's request. Yet it is assumed to be unconstitutional to direct a partial verdict 
against a defendant in a criminal case. See United States v. Hayward, 420 F.2d 142 (D.C. Cir. 
1969); United States v. England, 347 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1965). See a/so 2 C. WRIGHT, FED· 
ERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 461, at 243 n.8 (1969). 
The prohibition on partial directed verdicts in criminal cases cannot be based on a desire to 
allow the criminal jury to find facts, because such partial judgments are not entered when facts 
are genuinely in dispute. See note 42 supra. Nor can it be based on the ground that partial 
directed verdicts would altogether prevent juries from acquitting against the evidence, because 
juries would still retain the authority to return a general verdict. Rather, it must be based on 
the assumption that by removing crucial portions of a case from a jury's consideration, the trial 
judge precludes the jury from seeing the ''whole picture" of a defendant's conduct and thereby 
denies the jury an informational basis for exercising its veto power. See also note 49 i'!fra. 
46. Trial judges have authority to request a civil jury to supplement its general verdicts 
with answers to specific interrogatories, the purpose being to prevent the jury from returning a 
general verdict that is inconsistent with its specific findings. See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. 49(b). 
Yet it would be unconstitutional to require a crimin?,l jury to answer such interrogatories over 
a defendant's objection, for the same reason that it is unconstitutional to require a criminal 
jury to return special verdicts: each procedure is designed to prevent a jury from nullifying the 
law by returning a general verdict that is inconsistent with its specific findings. Indeed, inter-
rogatories are so disfavored that they may be unconstitutional even if they are used solely for 
informational value, and not as a basis for attacking a general verdict. See Heald v. Mullaney, 
505 F.2d 1241, 1245-46 (1st Cir. 1974) (use of interrogatories in some criminal proceedings is 
unconstitutional), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975); Spock v. United States, 416 F.2d 165, 180-
83 (1st Cir. 1969) (hut see Heald v. Mullaney, 505 F.2d at 1245, suggesting case was decided on 
basis of court's supervisory powers). 
The prohibition on interrogatories accompanying a general verdict cannot be based on a 
desire to allow the criminal jury to find facts, because the interrogatory procedure is designed 
to clar!fj,its findings of fact. Rather, it must be based on the assumption that the criminaljury 
cannot constitutionally be confined to making findings of fact and, instead, must be allowed to 
return general verdicts of not guilty that are inconsistent with its findings of fact. 
47. Trial judges have authority to order new trials in civil cases whenever a civil jury re-
turns inconsistent verdicts. See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. 59; 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FED· 
ERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2810, at 69 (1973). A federal judge may also order a new 
trial in a criminal case when a jury returns two inconsistent verdicts of guilty. See, e.g., United 
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preclusion based on previous fact-finding,49 and appeals and new 
trial orders based on legal errors affecting verdicts50) are all regularly 
used in civil jury trials. These devices may be constitutionally em-
ployed in civil cases because they do not intrude upon any function 
the civil jury is constitutionally entitled to perform. Since these de-
vices are all designed to prevent the jury from misapplying the law, 
and since the civil jury has no authority to decide the law differently 
from the legislature, these jury-control devices have no effect on the 
constitutional right of jury trial in civil cases.51 
States v. Daigle, 149 F. Supp. 409, 414 (D.D.C.), a.ffd., 248 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. 
denied, 355 U.S. 913 (1958). Yet a federal judge may not order a new trial when a criminal 
jury returns a ve:dict of not guilty that is inconsistent with an accompanying verdict of guilty. 
See Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932). 
The prohibition on new trials for inconsistent verdicts in criminal cases cannot be based on 
a desire to allow the jury to find facts, because the inconsistency demonstrates the failure of 
coherent fact-finding. Rather, it must be based on the assumption that a criminal jury has 
authority to acquit a defendant of one charge even if the acquittal is factually inconsistent with 
the jury's determination that he is factually guilty of another. See note 61 i'!fra. 
48. Federal judges have authority to co=ent on the evidence in civil cases. See 9 C. 
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2557 (1971). Yet regardless of 
how overwhelming the evidence of guilt may be in a criminal case, it is unconstitutional for a 
trial judge to comment to that effect, for the same reason that it is unconstitutional for a trial 
judge to direct a verdict of guilty in a criminal case. See United States v. England, 347 F.2d 
425, 433-35 (7th Cir. 1965). See also United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933); Homing 
v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 139 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
49. Principles of collateral estoppel can be invoked in a civil case by plaintiffs and defen-
dants alike to preclude a party from relitigating any issue that has already been adjudicated 
adversely to the party in a ptjor litigation. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 
322 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 
(1971). Collateral estoppel may also be invoked by a defendant against the prosecution in a 
criminal case. See, e.g., Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). Yet it is assumed to be uncon-
stitutional to estop a defendant in a criminal case from relitigating an issue that he has tried 
and failed to litigate successfully in a prior criminal proceeding. See Simpson v. Florida, 403 
U.S. 384, 386 (1971); United States v. De Angelo, 138 F.2d 466, 468 (3d Cir. 1943); United 
States v. Panetta, 436 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Pa. 1977), a.ffd., 568 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1978); State v. 
Stiefel, 256 So. 2d 581 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). But see United States v. Colacurcio, 514 F.2d 
l, 6 (9th Cir. 1975) (dictum). 
The prohibition on collateral estoppel against an accused in a criminal case cannot be 
based on a desire to allow juries to find facts, because the prohibition applies even where a 
prior jury has already found facts adverse to the accused. Nor can it be based on a desire to 
accord a defendant a right to be heard by a jury or to confront witnesses, or to enjoy his other 
procedural guarantees at trial, because, again, the doctrine applies even where a defendant 
enjoyed those guarantees at the prior proceeding. Rather, it must be based on the notion that 
by removing certain issues from a jury's consideration, collateral estoppel blinds the jury to the 
"whole picture" of a defendant's conduct and thus denies the jury an informational basis on 
which to exercise its veto power. See the discussion of partial directed verdicts at note 45 
supra. 
50. Appeals may be taken in civil cases, and new trials sought, by plaintiffs and defendants 
alike whenever they can show that a civil jury verdict is infected by legal error. See, e.g., 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 (1976); FED. R. CIV. P. 59-60. Moreover, defendants in criminal cases can ap-
peal from erroneous jury verdicts of conviction. Yet it is unconstitutional for the prosecution 
to appeal from, or seek a new trial following, a jury verdict of acquittal in a criminal case. See 
Standefer v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1999, 2007 (1980). 
51. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943); Cooper, supra note 43, at 912,915. 
1016 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 78:1001 
By the same token, however, such jury-control devices cannot be 
constitutionally used by the prosecution in criminal cases,52 because 
insofar as the criminal jury may dispense mercy to defendants by 
vetoing or nullifying the law, the criminal jury does possess authority 
to decide the law. The use (and nonuse) of directed verdicts illus-
trates this distinction. Directed verdicts are commonly used against 
plaintiffs and defendants alike in civil cases, and against the prosecu-
tion in criminal cases, but they are never used against defendants in 
criminal cases. Indeed, it is universally assumed to be unconstitu-
tional to direct a verdict against a defendant in a criminal case.53 
Why this excepti~n? Why prohibit the prosecution from using a 
device designed to confine the criminal jury to the province of fact-
finding? It cannot be based on a desire to let the jury find the facts, 
because directed verdicts are used only where facts are not in dis-
pute. 54 Nor can it be based upon the stringent burden of proof ap-
plicable in criminal cases (and upon the consequent difficulty of 
saying that the state's evidence of guilt is so overwhelming that rea-
sonable men would have to convict), because that is precisely the 
assessment that trial judges now make in finding criminal defendants 
guilty in trials to the bench, and that appellate courts now make in 
declaring constitutional errors to be harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.55 
Nor can the prohibition on directed verdicts be based on a belief 
that while the criminal jury has no legitimate right to nullify the law, 
it somehow has an unpreventable power to do so.56 After all, the 
52. See notes 42-50 supra. 
53. See note 42 supra. 
54. See Cooper, supra note 43, at 907-08, 912, 916-17, 918-21; Currie, supra note 42. In 
addition, see note 42 supra. 
55. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250,.254 (1969). 
56. For an expression of this view, see Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 347 (1976) 
(White, J., dissenting) (referring to the "raw power of nullification"); Dunn v. United States, 
284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932) (Holmes, J.), quotingfrom Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d 
Cir. 1925) (L. Hand, J.) (referring to jury nullification as the "assumption" by a jury of a 
"power" which it has "no right to exercise"). But compare Standefer v. United States, 100 S. 
Ct. 1999, 2007 (1980) (''The absence of these remedial ijury-control] procedures in criminal 
cases permits juries to acquit out of compassion .... ") (emphasis added); Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153, 199-200 n.50 (1976) (plurality opinion) (it would be "unconstitutional" to use 
jury control devices to prevent juries from engaging in "discretionary act[s] of jury nullifica-
tion"). 
The most fascinating question is, why did judges like Holmes and Hand, who must have 
known better, nonetheless feel obliged to intone the message that juries possess only the 
"power," and not the "right," to acquit against the evidence. Perhaps the answer is that such a 
message was their own form of "pious perjury." q. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE LAW 239 (1769) (jury nullification is the jury's form of "pious perjury"). That is, they may 
have known, consciously or subconsciously, that the message is false and that juries do possess 
the "right" to acquit against the evidence, and yet felt that they must continue to say otherwise, 
for the same reason that juries are not instructed that they are entitled to acquit against the 
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very purpose of the directed verdict (and other jury-control devices) 
is to prevent juries from exercising the power to decide the law when 
they have no right to do so. If the legal system wished to prevent the 
criminal jury from nullifying the law, it would respond the way it 
does in civil cases - by directing verdicts whenever the trial evi-
dence contains no genuine issues of fact. To say that a judge may 
not constitutionally direct a verdict against a defendant in a criminal 
case means that he may not constitutionally confine the criminal jury 
to the role of fact-finding. 57 The same is true, too, of other jury-
control devices. By eschewing the use of jury-control devices that 
would cabin the criminal jury in a fact-finding role, the system 
reveals that the jury's prerogative to acquit against the evidence is 
not only·a "power," but a power the jury exercises as of "right."58 
The instant rule of double jeopardy, that the state may not take 
evidence: because if juries begin to learn that they may acquit against the evidence as of 
"right," their exercise of nullification will become self-conscious and will have a distorting 
effect on competing and coexisting values inherent in trial by jury. q. United States v. 
Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, I 130-36 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (jurors, who possess the prerogative to 
acquit against the evidence, should not be so instructed, because by rendering nullification 
self-conscious, such instructions may have a distorting effect on other procedural values). 
57. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 n.10 (1979) (to say that "there can be no 
appeal from a judgment of acquittal, even if the evidence of guilt is overwhelming," means, as 
a "logical corollary," that the jury is "permilletl' to acquit against the evidence) (emphasis 
added). 
58. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,317 n.10 (1979); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
199-200 n.50 (1976) (plurality opinion); M. KADISH & s. KADISH, DISCRETION To DISOBEY 57 
(1973). 
It does not follow that, because jurors have a constitutionally protected prerogative to ac-
quit against the evidence, they must be told that they do, or that they must be subject to voir 
dire in such a light, or that they must be allowed to hear evidence relevant to such a decision. 
There are persuasive reasons why the latter procedures would not only be difficult to adminis-
ter, but would also have an adverse impact on coexisting and competing values in trial by jury. 
See Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895) (it does not follow that, because 
criminal jurors have a constitutional right to return a general verdict of not guilty, they also 
have a right to be instructed on lesser-included offenses not supported by the evidence); United 
States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (it does not follow that, because 
criminal jurors have a constitutional prerogative to acquit against the evidence, they also have 
a right to be instructed on the prerogative). Thus, it is perfectly rational to affirm the value of 
jury nullification while simultaneously refraining from encumbering it with accompanying 
procedural devices. 
Nor does it follow that because juries have a constitutionally protected prerogative to ac-
quit against the evidence, the exercise of that prerogative is always beyond challenge. On the 
contrary, the Court has held in the death-penalty context that jury nullification, if unguided by 
standards, may have the effect of rendering the pattern of death sentences so arbitrary as to 
violate the eighth amendment. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302-03 (1976) 
(plurality opinion). But compare 428 U.S. at 315 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153, 203 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
Finally, it does not follow that because juries have a prerogative to acquit against the evi-
dence, erroneous jury verdicts of not guilty must always be upheld. On the contrary, one could 
rationally distinguish between errors (such as the exclusion of incriminating evidence) that 
affect a jury's decision to nullify and errors that do not, and reverse for the former while 
continuing to dismiss for the latter. See Westen & Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double 
Jeopardy, 1978 SUP. CT. REv. 81, 130 n.230. 
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an appeal from an erroneous jury verdict of not guilty, is an aspect of 
the broader principle of jury nullification: the jury-acquittal rule de-
rives from the criminal jury's constitutional prerogative to acquit 
against the evidence. To say that a verdict is erroneous means that it 
is the end product of a trial that did not conform to the rules gov-
erning opening statements, evidence, jury instructions, closing state-
ments, and so forth. The purpose of such rules is to insure that a 
case is tried in accord with the legislative standard governing guilt or 
innocence. Yet as long as the criminal jury has authority to acquit 
against the evidence, viz., authority to alter legislative standards in 
favor of more lenient standards of its own, trial errors of that kind 
may be immaterial. One cannot tell whether an "erroneous" acquit-
tal is the product of legal error, or whether it is the fruit of the jury's 
desire to nullify the law by which the case was tried. Since the jury 
verdict itself is opaque,59 and since the jury cannot be easily ex-
amined about its verdict without skewing its deliberations, 60 two al-
ternatives remain: either to reject all "erroneous" jury verdicts, 
knowing full well that some of them will be based on the jury's de-
sire to nullify, or to accept all such verdicts, knowing that some of 
them will be the product oflegal errors. As between the two alterna-
tives, the jury-acquittal rule opts for the latter, reflecting the judg-
ment that it is ultimately better to err in favor of nullification than 
against it.61 
59. As part of its authority to acquit against the evidence, the criminal jury has the consti-
tutional prerogative to return a general verdict, and it cannot constitutionally be compelled to 
return special verdicts instead. See Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 81, 83, 87, 
94-95 (1895). In addition, see note 44 supra. 
60. See Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 394 (1932) ("That the [inconsistent] verdict 
may have been the result of compromise, or of a mistake on the part of the jury, is possible. 
But verdicts cannot be upset by ... inquiry into such matters"); United States v. D'Angelo, 
598 F.2d 1002, 1004-05 (5th Cir. 1979) (collecting authorities); United States v. Spock, 416 
F.2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969) (inquiry into the grounds for a jury verdict may skew its conclu-
sions). See generally Note, Constitutional Propriety ef State Judges' Inquiries into the Numerical 
.Division ef .Deadlocked Jurie.r. Ellis v. Reed, 64 MINN. L. REV. 813 (1980). 
61. The decision to tip the balance in favor of nullification is not unusual, because the 
same decision underlies the rule that a defendant who has been convicted by a jury on one 
count and acquitted on another cannot challenge his conviction on grounds of inconsistency 
between the two verdicts. When a jury returns inconsistent verdicts, its behavior can be ex-
plained in one of two ways: either it has misunderstood its instructions and, therefore, erred; 
or it has deliberately acted out of "compassion or compromise," Standefer v. United States, 
100 S. Ct. 1999, 2007 (1980), by acquitting the defendant of a count of which it could have 
convicted him. Without examining the jury about its verdict, see note 60 supra, the trial court 
has no way of knowing which of the two potentialities occurred. Accordingly, the court can 
respond either by setting aside all inconsistent convictions for error, knowing all along that at 
least some of them are the product of jury compassion, or by upholding all inconsistent convic-
tions in the interest of nullification, knowing that some of them may be the product of error on 
the part of the jury. The majority rule is that an appellate court may not set aside inconsistent 
jury verdicts of guilty that can plausibly be explained as the product of" 'lenity'" on the part 
of the jury. See Note, 35 Mo. L. REV. 535, 541 (1976), quoting Dunn v. United States, 284 
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Now having identified the value or rationale underlying the jury-
acquittal rule, we can return to our original question. What is the 
relationship between the jury-acquittal rule of double jeopardy and 
the government's authority to appeal criminal sentences? What does 
the constitutional finality of jury acquittals say about the finality of 
trial court determinations of sentence? The answer depends upon 
whether the prerogative to nullify is possessed not only by juries, but 
also by trial judges, and upon whether the scope of nullification ex-
tends not only to issues of guilt or innocence, but also to the length 
of sentence. If the authority to nullify is not shared by judges as well 
as by juries, or if it does not apply to sentencing, the jury-acquittal 
rule has nothing to say about government appeals of criminal 
sentences. If, on the other hand, nullification extends to judges as 
well as juries, and if it encompasses sentencing as well as guilt or 
innocence, the constitutional value underlying the jury-acquittal rule 
would prohibit the government from seeking to increase a defend-
ant's sentence on. appeal. 
The foregoing issues cannot be resolved purely by means oflogic. 
As a matter of logic, one can rationally imagine regimes in which the 
authority to nullify is possessed by both juries and judges, or by 
neither juries or judges, or by one but not the other; by the same 
token, one can rationally conceive of systems in which the authority 
to nullify encompasses both guilt and sentence, or neither, or one but 
not the other. The real issue, therefore, is not what our constitu-
tional system rationally could be, but what it actually is. 
Based on the same sort of data that suggest that criminal juries 
U.S. 390, 393 (1932) (Holmes, J.). The majority rule thus reflects a decision that if error must 
occur, it is better to err in the interest of preserving jury nullification. See Bickel, Judge and 
Jury- Inconsistent Verdicts in the Federal Courts, 63 HARV. L. REV. 649, 651-52 (1950). See 
also United States v. Carbone, 378 F.2d 420, 422-23 (2d Cir.) ("It is true, as both Judge Hand 
and Mr. Justice Holmes recognized, that allowing inconsistent verdicts in criminal trials runs 
the risk that an occasional conviction may have been the result of compromise. But the advan-
tage ofleaving the jury free to exercise its historic power oflenity has been correctly thought to 
outweigh that danger.") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 914 (1967). 
To be sure, the existing rule might be different if, as a result of reversing a conviction for 
inconsistency, the government were allowed to retry the defendant on the count on which he 
was acquitted. In that event, a defendant would have to choose his theory of what motivated 
the jury in returning inconsistent verdicts. Ifhe decided the jury was motivated by "lenity," he 
would be barred from appealing his conviction. If he decided the jury was motivated by error, 
he would be barred from complaining about being retried on the count on which he was ac-
quitted. In either event, he would be precluded from doing what he may now do: appeal his 
conviction on grounds of error, while defending his acquittal on grounds oflenity. Before such 
a new rule could be adopted, however, the courts would have to decide whether the interest in 
jury lenity is an interest possessed only by defendants; for if the government, too, has an inter-
est in the occurrence of nullification, then it could complain about the reversal of an inconsis-
tent verdict of guilty even if the defendant were willing to be retried on the count on which he 
was acquitted. 
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do possess sixth amendment authority to acquit against the evidence, 
it is fair to conqlude that trial judges do not possess comparable fifth 
and fourteenth amendment authority. Judges (unlike juries) may be 
reversed for legal errors favorable to the defense, regardless of 
whether the favorable rulings occur before or after the case has been 
submitted to· the jury, 62 and regardless of whether reversal of the 
favorable ruling necessitates retrial of the general issue.63 Moreover, 
and more significantly still, trial magistrates can be reversed for fact-
finding favorable to the defense, provided that the reversal is based 
on the record as taken at trial and does not require the taking of new 
evidence. Thus, the Court held in Swisher v. Brady64 that a state 
62. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978) (before); Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 
23 (1977) (before); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978) (after); United States v. 
Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975) (after). 
To be sure, the Court has also held that a trial judge may not be reversed for certain kinds 
of erroneous rulings favorable to a defendant, i.e., resolutions of factual elements relating to a 
defendant's guilt or innocence, if reversal would require that a defendant be retried. See 
Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 71-73 (1978); United States v. Martin Linen Supply 
Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977). Yet if trial judges truly possessed the prerogative to nullify, then 
favorable rulings by trial judges on issues of guilt or innocence would be final and nonappeala-
ble, regardless of whether the rulings were entered before trial or afterwards, and regardless of 
whether reversal would result in retrial. But they are not. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 
82, 91 n.7 (1978) (government may appeal an erroneous resolution ofa factual issue relating to 
a defendant's guilt or innocence if appeal will result in reinstatement of an existing and valid 
verdict of guilty); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978) (same); Forman v. United 
States, 361 U.S. 416, 426 (1960) (same); United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 (1976) (govern-
ment may always appeal an erroneous ruling in a defendant's favor if the ruling is entered 
before trial); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975) (same). Whatever the justification 
for the finality of the rulings in Sanabria and Marlin Linen, therefore, the justification cannot 
be that trial judges possess the prerogative to acquit against the evidence. 
63. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978). 
64. 438 U.S. 204 (1978). To be sure, the Swisher Court held that the Maryland procedure 
consisted not of"two trials," 438 U.S. at 217, but ofa "single proceeding,'' 438 U.S. at 215, for 
double jeopardy purposes. But it should be obvious that to say the Maryland procedure is a 
"single proceeding" for double jeopardy purposes is like saying it is a regime of "continuing 
jeopardy": the statement is a conclusion, not an explanation. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 
534 (1975) ("The phrase 'continuing jeopardy' describes ... a conclusion"), That is, to call 
the Maryland procedure a "single proceeding" for double jeopardy purposes is simply to say 
that the discrete procedural steps prescribed by Maryland law will be treated as a "continuing" 
procedure for constitutional purposes. It does not explain why the discrete steps should be so 
treated. If the Court's conclusion is sound, it is because for double jeopardy purposes there is 
nothing wrong with a system of bench trials in which the findings made by the magistrate who 
hears the evidence and compiles the record are not final until accepted by a higher tribunal. 
The same is true of the Swisher Court's statements that the trial magistrate was a "master" 
rather than a "judge," 438 U.S. at 216, and that he was authorized only to make "proposed 
findings" rather than to enter final •~udgment[s]." 438 U.S. at 217 n.15. These statements, 
again, are entirely conclusory. They describe the double jeopardy effects of the Maryland 
procedure, but they do not explain its constitutional rationale. 
The foregoing point can be illustrated by assuming that Maryland now provides that all 
juries shall henceforth act as "master[s],'' and that they shall have the authority to return only 
"proposed findings,'' rather than final •~udgment[s]." What would the Court say about such a 
system? Would it accept for double jeopardy purposes Maryland's characterization of its pro-
cedure as a "single proceeding"? Presumably not. Presumably it would say that while the 
procedure was a "single proceeding" for purposes of Maryland law, it was not a single pro-
ceeding for double jeopardy purposes, because the double jeopardy clause prohibits the states 
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may provide for a system of bench trials in criminal cases in which a 
trial magistrate not only lacks the authority to acquit against the evi-
dence, but cannot make final rulings oflaw or fact - including find-
ings of not guilty - until affirmed on appeal by a higher tribunal. 
This stands in marked contrast to the criminal jury whose verdicts 
are constitutionally immune from appeal both on law and fact. 
Furthermore, even if the prerogative of nullification extended to 
judges, it does not extend to sentencing. If it did, criminal sentences 
(like jury verdicts of not guilty) would be absolutely final. Yet the 
Court has repeatedly and consistently held that, where a def end ant 
appeals his conviction, a trial judge's determination of sentence can 
be expunged and the defendant sentenced de novo, something that 
cannot happen to a jury finding of not guilty.65 Indeed, the Court 
appears to adhere to the view that where sentencing is explicitly left 
to a jury, even jury sentences may be set aside and reexamined de 
novo.66 
from treating jury verdicts of not guilty as nonfinal. The latter conclusion is significant be-
cause it underscores the double jeopardy differences between the kind of proceeding at issue in 
Swisher and a typical jury trial. If it is true that there is a constitutional difference between the 
finality of the Swisher magistrate's "proposed findings" and the finality of a jury's verdict of 
not guilty (and the Swisher Court held there was), it is not because of any fifth amendment 
notions of finality, but because of sixth amendment notions of trial by jury that the double 
jeopardy clause incorporates by reference. See note 99 infra. That is, what distinguishes 
Swisher from the jury case is not that the Swisher magistrate's findings were only tentative, but 
that Maryland was constitutionally allowed to treat them as tentative. And the reason Mary-
land was allowed to treat the magistrate's findings as tentative is because he was a magistrate 
rather than a jury. See Westen & Drubel, supra note 58, at 132-37. Indeed, to the extent that 
favorable findings or rulings by a judge are final for double jeopardy purposes, this is so only 
because the double jeopardy clause incorporates by reference standards of finality that are 
otherwise provided by law. For the extent to which the due process clause and/or the domes-
tic law may prevent an appellate court from disregarding a trial judge's assessment of raw 
facts, see the discussion of Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Swisher in note 99 infra, 
and the discussion of Martin Linen in note 146 infra. For the extent to which a procedural 
regime may choose to vest nullification authority in a trial judge without having been constitu-
tionally compelled to do so, see the discussion of Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904), 
in Westen & Drubel, supra note 58, at 132-37. 
65. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 719-21 (1969). It is true, of course, 
that the defendant in Pearce appealed his conviction, but it does not follow that he was willing 
to be resentenced de novo in the event his conviction was reversed on appeal. More impor-
tantly, when a defendant has been implicitly acquitted by a jury on a greater charge, he cannot 
be retried on that charge, even if he does appeal his underlying conviction. See Green v. 
United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). Thus, a comparison of Pearce to Green demonstrates that 
a judge's determination of sentence in a defendant's favor does not enjoy the constitutional 
measure of finality possessed by a jury verdict in a defendant's favor. 
66. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 23-24 (1973); Stroud v. United States, 251 
U.S. 15 (1919). It is true, of course, that the defendants in Chaffin and Stroud took the initia-
tive in appealing the original convictions that underlay their original jury sentences. Nonethe-
less, even if they can be said to have waived their interest in the finality of their original jury 
sentences by appealing their underlying convictions, it is significant that they could not have 
been found to have waived their interest in finality if the original juries' favorable decisions 
had related to the elements of the alleged offenses, rather than to the length of their sentences. 
See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1957). Thus, even assuming arguendo that 
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The upshot is that the constitutional rule of "absolute finality" 
for jury acquittals is confined to jury verdicts of not guilty, and does 
not extend either to findings of not guilty by the bench or to determi-
nations of sentence. There is nothing arbitrary in this. There are 
significant differences between juries and judges that would justify 
- though not necessitate - giving juries alone the prerogative to 
acquit against the evidence.67 Similarly, there are significant differ-
ences between determinations of guilt or innocence and determina-
tions of sentences that would justify confining nullification to the 
former.68 To say that the jury-acquittal rule does not extend to 
the doctrine of waiver has some vitality, the Court draws a significant distinction between a 
favorable judgment by a jury regarding the elements of an offense (which cannot be waived) 
and a favorable judgment by a jury regarding the length of a sentence (which can be waived), 
The foregoing distinction between guilt or innocence, on the one hand, and length of sen-
tence, on the other, is best illustrated by Cichos v. Indiana, 385 U.S. 76 (1966). The defendant 
in Cichos was tried on two counts: involuntary manslaughter, punishable by two to twenty-
one years imprisonment; and reckless homicide, punishable by one to five years imprisonment, 
He was originally found guilty of reckless homicide and sentenced to one to five years. After 
successfully appealing his conviction, he was retried again on both counts and again sentenced 
to one to five years in prison. He appealed, arguing that he had been placed twice in jeopardy 
for the same offense by being retried for the greater offense of involuntary manslaughter after 
the original jury had implicitly acquitted him of involuntary manslaughter. That is, the de-
fendant relied on the principle of "implicit acquittal" that the court had already accepted in 
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), and later reaffirmed in Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 
323 (1970) (it is a violation of double jeopardy not only to convict a defendant of a charge of 
which he has been implicitly acquitted, but also to retry him for that offense, even where retrial 
results again in an implicit acquittal of that offense). The Court in Cichos found it unnecessary 
to decide whether the double jeopardy clause applied to the states, because the Court held that 
even if the clause applied, it was not violated in Cichos, because Cichos was significantly dif-
ferent from Green. In Green, the defendant was originally tried on two separate offenses, each 
having distinct elements of its own and one being more serious than the other; in Cichos, on 
the other had, the two offenses of involuntary manslaughter and reckless homicide contained 
identical elements, the difference between them being solely a difference in the length of sen• 
tence. This distinction is significant, the Court held, because the doctrine of implicit acquittal 
only applies to favorable determinations by a jury regarding the elements of an offense, and 
not to favorable determinations by a jury regarding the length of sentence. In sum, the Court 
distinguishes for double jeopardy purposes between favorable determinations regarding guilt 
or innocence and favorable determinations regarding the length of sentence, and it makes the 
distinction even in cases in which both determinations are made by juries. 
For a discussion of the justification for treating determinations of sentence differently from 
determintions of guilt or innocence, see note 68 i,!fra. 
61. See United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 902-03 (2d Cir. 1960), noted in Mayers & 
Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 14 HARV. L. REV. I, 27-28, 
42-43 (1960). See also Curtis, The Trial Judge and the Jury, 5 VAND. L. REV, ISO, 157-66 
(1951). 
68. The differences are threefold. First, decisions regarding guilt or innocence are ei• 
ther/or decisions, while decisions regarding sentence are finely graded decisions on a spec-
trum. In deciding guilt or innocence, the trier of facts makes gross decisions to convict or 
acquit, or to convict on a greater offense or convict on a significantly different lesser offense; in 
fixing a precise sentence, in contrast, the trier of fact chooses from among an almost infinite 
array of possibilities. Second, decisions regarding guilt or innocence are approximate, while 
designations of sentence are fully informed. When a trier of fact decides between convicting or 
acquitting, or between convicting on a higher or convicting on a lower offense, it does not 
know the precise consequence to the defendant of the various alternatives; when a trier of fact 
fixes a particular sentence from within a range of sentences, in contrast, it knows precisely 
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judges or to sentences is simply to say that ours is a constitutional 
regime that has reasonably opted for less nullification where it could 
conceivably have opted for more. 
In summary, the first of the three rules of double jeopardy (that a 
defendant cannot be further prosecuted following an "acquittal") 
imposes no limitation on the authority of the government to appeal a 
criminal sentence. A trial judge who sentences a defendant does not 
implicitly "acquit" him of all higher sentences, because given the 
values that underlie double jeopardy, "acquittals" for double jeop-
ardy purposes are confined to jury verdicts of not guilty. That does 
not mean, however, that the double jeopardy clause necessarily con-
dones government appeals of sentence. It means, rather, that if 
double jeopardy prohibits such appeals, it does so not because of the 
rule against prosecution following an acquittal, but because of sepa-
rate rules that remain to be explored. 
B. .Double Punishment: A .Defendant's Interest in the Lawful 
Administration of Prescribed Sentences 
Another potential limitation on government appeals of sentence 
is the prohibition of double, or "multiple,"69 punishment. This rule 
of double jeopardy, that a defendant may not be punished "twice" 
what the consequence to the defendant will be. Third, decisions regarding guilt or innocence 
are guided by instructions regarding particular and limited elements constituting the underly-
ing offenses, and by the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Decisions regard-
ing sentence are more open-textured. When a trier of fact decides to convict or acquit, or to 
convict of a greater or lesser offense, its decision is guided by its instructions regarding the 
particular elements of the underlying offenses; when a trier of fact fixes a sentence, in contrast, 
it may receive no guidance at all regarding either the standards for sentencing or the burdens 
of proof to be employed. 
The foregoing distinctions help explain why a legal system might wish to confine the pre-
rogative of nullification to determinations of guilt or innocence. It is precisely because nullifi-
cation regarding guilt or innocence is less finely tuned, less self-conscious, less informed and 
less guided that a legal system may allow it to operate there, while not allowing nullification 
with respect to the more finely tuned, more informed and more self-conscious process of sen-
tencing. This does not mean that the legal system is opposed to nullification. It simply means 
that the value of nullification must be balanced against other competing interests, and that if 
nullification becomes too self-conscious and too explicit, it will have a distorting ~ffect on those 
other interests. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (it 
does not follow that because the criminal jury has a constitutional prerogative to acquit against 
the evidence, it must also be explicitly instructed that it possesses such prerogatives); M. KAD-
ISH & S. KADISH, supra note 58, at 64-65 (same). 
The foregoing distinctions also suggest that the more closely a sentencing decision approxi-
mates a decision regarding guilt or innocence, the more persuasive the defendant's claim for 
finality. See State ex rel Westfall v. Mason, 594 S.W.2d 908, 921-22 (Mo. 1980) (Bardgett, 
C.J., dissenting) (the death penalty is authorized only if the jury finds beyond a reasonable 
doubt that a statutory aggravating circumstance exists; failure of the jury to make that finding 
should be treated as an implicit acquittal that immunizes the defendant from being retried and 
resentenced to death). 
69. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). 
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for the "same" offense, was first invoked by the Court over a hun-
dred years ago in the first of its great double jeopardy decisions.70 
Unfortunately, despite the rule's venerable antiquity, the Court has 
never clearly identified the constitutional value, or rationale, that in-
forms the rule. To determine whether the prohibition has any bear-
ing on unilateral government appeal of sentences, therefore, one 
must begin by identifying the purpose of the prohibition on double 
punishment. 
This much is clear: the double jeopardy clause prohibits the state 
from punishing a person twice for conduct that, by law, can be pun-
ished only once. That is to say, the state may not "double up" on a 
defendant's sentence by punishing him "again" after he has fully 
served the proper sentence prescribed by law for an offense. The real 
task is to identify the source and content of the law that defines the 
proper sentence for proscribed conduct. One cannot know whether a 
defendant is being punished twice without knowing whether he has 
yet been fully punished once, and one cannot know whether a de-
fendant has been punished once without identifying the law that 
governs sentences for particular conduct. 
Paradoxically, the two sources of law most commonly advanced 
are both ultimately untenable. It is sometimes suggested, on the one 
hand, that the double jeopardy clause contains an independent stan-
dard of its own for defining the existence of a criminal offense and 
for establishing the maximum permissible sentence for such an of-
fense. According to that view, a state violates the prohibition of 
double punishment whenever it defines criminal offenses in such a 
way as to "double up" on what the double jeopardy clause itself de-
fines to be the maximum sentence for an underlying offense.71 
The obvious problem with the foregoing view is that the Consti-
tution contains few (if any) standards for defining the constituent 
elements of criminal offenses, and even fewer standards for deter-
mining the maximum permissible length of criminal sentences. At 
most, the Constitution prohibits the state from imposing serious 
criminal penalties on defendants for conduct for which they are not 
personally at fault,72 and from imposing sentences which are "ex-
10. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873). 
11. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 792-94 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that even if Congress intended multiple punishments, the imposition of such punish-
ment violated the double jeopardy clause). 
72. See Jeffries & Stephan, .Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal 
Law, 88 YALE LJ. 1325, 1370-76 (1979) (collecting authorities). 
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treme[ly]" disproportionate to the severity of a crime.73 Beyond 
those very minimum prerequisites, the elements of a criminal offense 
and "the length of the sentence" are "purely ... matter[s] oflegisla-
tive prerogative."74 Thus, if the principle of double punishment is 
based on a constitutional definition of criminal offenses and on a con-
stitutional measure of excessive sentences, it is both superfluous and 
innocuous: superfluous, because it adds nothing to the protection 
already provided by the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the 
eighth amendment and the due process clauses of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments; innocuous, because the limitations it prescribes 
are too lax and too general ever realistically to come into play. 
It is also said, on the other hand, that the double jeopardy clause 
merely incorporates by ·reference whatever the domestic law - state 
or federal - defines as an offense and as a lawful sentence for· an 
offense; hence, a court violates the double jeopardy clause if it im-
poses a sentence in excess of what-the legislature intended as the full 
penalty for a particular offense.75 Unfortunately, this formulation, 
too, is flawed because it produces a principle of double punishment 
that will always be either superfluous or irrelevant: if a court is ap-
plying statutes enacted by its 9wn respective legislature, double pun-
ishment becomes irrelevant because the court's constitutional 
analysis will always be identical to, and entirely derivative from, its 
statutory analysis of legislative intent; if a court is reviewing the stat-
utes of a sister jurisdiction, double punishment becomes irrelevant 
because the court will always be bound by the sister jurisdiction's 
interpretation of its own statutes. 
Assume, for example, that a federal defendant who has been 
tried and convicted of violating federal law now raises a claim of 
double punishment in a federal court. If the double jeopardy clause 
merely incorporates by reference whatever the federal legislature has 
defined certain offenses and sentences to be, then in order to deter-
mine whether double punishment has occurred, the federal court 
must interpret federal law. If its interpretation shows that the federal 
legislature intended the offenses and sentences to accumulate, the de-
fendant's punishment will be lawful both under federal law and 
under the double jeopardy laws; if its interpretation shows that the 
federal legislature did not intend the offenses and sentences to accu-
73. Rummel v. Estelle, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 1139 (1980). See also 100 S. Ct. at 1136; Weems v. 
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910). 
74. Rummel v. Estelle, 100 S. Ct. at 1139. 
15. See Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1443-45 (1980) ((Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). ' 
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mulate, the defendant's punishment will be unlawful under both fed-
eral law and the fifth amendment. In either event, the foregoing 
notion of double punishment is superfluous because its conclusions 
are always dependent upon the results already reached by means of 
statutory interpretation. 76 
Now assume, on the other hand, that a state-court defendant who 
has been convicted of violating state law now raises a claim of 
double punishment in a federal court. Since federal courts are 
bound by state interpretations of state law, the federal court's analy-
sis of double punishment can never come into play. If the state 
courts have concluded that the state offenses and sentences were in-
tended to accumulate, the federal court will have to accept their con-
clusion, because it has no constitutional basis for setting it aside. If 
the state courts have already concluded that the state offenses and 
sentences were not intended to accumulate, the defendant will have 
already prevailed on his claim and will have nothing further to re-
quest from the federal court. In either event, the claim of double 
punishment is irrelevant because it adds nothing to what the defen-
dant has already received in state courts under state law.77 
Fortunately, there exists still a third view of double punishment, 
a view that falls in between the other two and yet avoids the 
problems they present: the double jeopardy clause operates as a pre-
sumption against finding that domestic law intends multiple offenses 
and multiple punishment, a presumption that can be overcome only 
by "clear and unmistakable"78 evidence that the domestic law in-
tends offenses and sentences to be cumulated.79 This solution avoids 
both horns of the dilemma. It frees the legislature to define offenses 
ap.d parcel out sentences in the way the legislature desires, by requir-
76. [l]fthe only question confronting this Court is whether Congress intended to author-
ize cumulative punishments for rape and for felony murder based upon rape, this Court 
need decide no constitutional question whatsoever. 
Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1443 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
77. To the extent that the Court implies that a state court can ever err in the interpreta-
tion of its own law and that such an error would create a federal question reviewable by 
this Court, I believe it clearly wrong. 
Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1446 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (footnote 
omitted). 
The only exception is in state criminal cases removed from prosecution to a federal court 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442-1443 (1976). In that event, the federal court would have to construe 
state law as applied to the defendant without any prior construction by a state court. The 
double jeopardy clause would not in that event be irrelevant, but it would be superfluous, 
because it would lead to no different construction of state law than the federal law would reach 
anyway as a matter of statutory construction. 
78. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 791 (1975). 
79. For an excellent discussion of this theory, see Co=ent, Twice in Jeopardy, 15 YALE 
L.J. 262 (1965). 
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ing the courts to adhere to legislative schemes of punishment that are 
"clear and unmistakable."80 Yet it also permits the courts to reject 
judicial interpretations of domestic law, by authorizing the courts to 
subject multiple punishment to constitutional review, and to invali-
date such punishment wherever the evidence for its intended exist-
ence is less than clear.81 
This principle, that the double jeopardy clause operates as a re-
buttable presumption against multiple punishment, has several vir-
tues. It is the only formulation of this facet of the double jeopardy 
clause that can give constitutional content to the clause without in-
truding upon the legislature's authority to define offenses and penal-
ties, because other constructions inevitably render the double 
jeopardy clause either unduly intrusive or entirely meaningless. In 
addition, it fully accords with the Supreme Court's decisions regard-
ing double punishment.82 Finally, it corresponds with comparable 
80. The only constitutional limitations on the authority of the legislature to impose punish-
ments that it clearly intends are limitations that are found in provisions of the Constitution 
other than the double jeopardy clause. See Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1436 n.3 
(1980). 
81. A constitutional presumption of this kind does not place a federal court in the untena-
ble position of either passively parroting or wrongfully second-guessing a domestic court's 
interpretation of domestic law, see notes 75-77 supra, because the substantive content of the 
constitutional rule requires a court to strike down multiple sentences unless domestic law 
"clearly and unmistakably" intends them. As an illustration, consider the constitutional rule 
that courts must invalidate any criminal statute that is too vague to give citizens notice of the 
kinds of conduct that are prohibited. When a·federal court examines a state criminal statute 
for vagueness, it does not feel bound by the state court's determination as to the clarity of the 
state statute. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (holding a Florida 
vagrancy statute unconstitutional on grounds of vagueness), reversing Brown v. City of Jack-
sonville, 236 So. 2d 141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (declaring that the state vagrancy statute was 
not vague). At the same time, however, in determining vagueness a federal court is not enti-
tled to disregard a state court's construction of its own statute. See Wainwright v. Stone, 414 
U.S. 21, 22-23 (1973) ("For the purpose of determining whether a state statute is too vague and 
indefinite to constitute valid legislation, 'we must take the statute as though it read precisely as 
the highest court of the State has interpreted it' ") ( citation omitted). Instead, while taking the 
state statute to mean what the state court says it does, the federal court then goes on to decide 
whether that interpretation renders the prohibition impermissibly vague. See 414 U.S. at 23 
("When a state statute has been construed to forbid identifiable conduct . . . claims of imper-
missible vagueness must be judged in that light."). 
The same is true of the presumption against double punishment. In applying the presump-
tion, a federal court is not bound by a state court's determination as to the clarity of the state 
legislature's intention to impose multiple punishment. At the same time, a federal court is not 
free to reject the state court's interpretation of its own law. Instead, while accepting the state 
court's determination of its own law, the federal court goes on to decide whether the state law 
is sufficiently "clear and unmistakable" to justify the imposition of multiple punishment. See 
Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1439 (1980) (invalidating multiple punishment, not 
because the domestic court's interpretation of domestic statutes was in obvious error, but be-
cause the domestic law as interpreted was not sufficiently clear under scrutiny of the double 
jeopardy clause to justify multiple punishment). 
82. The Court's decisions as to whether the state may impose multiple sentences for a 
single course of conduct following a single trial fall into two categories: (I) cases in which the 
Court rejects the claim of multiple punishment; and (2) cases in which the Court sustains the 
claim of multiple punishment. I have found no cases in category (I) in which a claim of 
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values underlying the constitutional prohibition of vague criminal 
statutes83 and the constitutional rule that criminal statutes be nar-
double punishment was rejected in the face of a legislative desire for single punishment; in-
stead, the Court has rejected such claims where it has found that the legislature intended mul-
tiple punishment for a single offense. See, e.g., Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975); 
Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961); United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18 (1948); 
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 
U.S. 640 (1946); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932); United States v. Adams, 
281 U.S. 202 (1930); Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1927); United States v. Daugherty, 
269 U.S. 360 (1926); Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625 (1915); Gavieres v. United States, 220 
U.S. 338 (1911); Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906). Perhaps the closest cases to the 
contrary are Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958) (upholding consecutive sentences 
under separate statutory provisions for a single sale of narcotics) and Holiday v. Johnston, 313 
U.S. 342, 349 (1941) (stating that the erroneous imposition of cumulative sentences in a single 
case raises no issue of double jeopardy) (dictum). Yet in Gore the majority held that it could 
not "reasonably" be "maintained" that Congress intended that a single punishment be im-
posed for the conduct engaged in. 357 U.S. at 389. As for Holiday, the Court's statement was 
not only dictum, 313 U.S. at 349, but it was made without any supporting authority whatso-
ever, and has not been cited as'authority by the Court in any subsequent decisions. To be sure, 
Justice Rehnquist suggested in Whalen that Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 173 (1958), 
held that the erroneous imposition of multiple punishment raises " 'no constitutional issue.' " 
Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1444 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Examination 
shows, however, that the Ladner Court was saying not that the erroneous imposition of multi-
ple sentence can never present an issue of double.jeopardy, but rather that the alleged errone-
ous imposition of the multiple punishment in Ladner did not present such an issue because it 
had not been properly raised by the defendant. 
As for category (2), I have found no cases in which the Court sustained a claim of double 
punishment where the legislature could reasonably be said to have intended multiple punish-
ment; instead, the Court has sustained such claims where it has.found that Congress did no/ 
intend double punishment, see, e.g., Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978); Jeffers v. 
United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977); Milanovich v. United States, 365 U.S. 551 (1961); Heflin v. 
United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959); Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958); Prince v. 
United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957); United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 
218 (1952), or where it has not found congressional intent to impose multiple punishment, see, 
e.g., Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49 (1942). In all the cases cited to the contrary, 
multiple punishments were imposed in the course of successive prosecution, rather than at a 
single prosecution. See, e.g., Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977) (per curiam); Brown v. 
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977). These cases are distinguishable, however, because they present 
issues not of multiple punishment, but of successive prosecutions. Whalen v. United States, 
100 S. Ct. 1432, 1441 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
83. The void-for-vagueness decisions fall into two categories for our purposes: (I) cases in 
which statutes are too vague to give persons notice of the kinds of conduct that are prohibited; 
and (2) cases in which notice is immaterial, but in which statutes are too vague to give execu-
tive officials guidance as to what the legislature intended. See Amsterdam, Federal Conslllu-
tiona/ Restrictions on the Punishment of Crimes of Sia/us, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, 
Crimes of .Displeasing Police Officers, and the Like, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 205, 216-24 (1967). 
It is the second category of cases that is pertinent here. When a court strikes down such 
statutes for being unconstitutionally vague, it is not because the statutes fail to give persons 
requisite notice, but because the statutes represent an unconstitutional delegation oflegislative 
power to courts, prosecutors, and policemen to define crimes and punishment. See Giaccio v. 
Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 403 (1966); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); Herndon 
v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 263 (1937). The real gravamen, in other words, is not that citizens will 
not be able to conform their behavior to the requirements of the criminal law, but that prose-
cutors and courts will punish persons whom the legislature may not have clearly intended to 
punish. This is the same constitutional principle that underlies the prohibition on multiple 
punishment, viz., that the prosecutors and courts impose multiple punishments only where the 
legislature's desire for them is "clear and unmistakable.'' 
Consider, for example, United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948). The defendant in 
Evans was charged with harboring an illegal alien in violation of a statute which "clcar[ly]" 
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rowly construed. 84 Indeed, each o( these constitutional doctrines, 
viz., the rebuttable presumption against double punishment, the pro-
hibition of vague criminal statutes, and the canon of narrow con-
struction for criminal statutes, are all part of the more general 
principle that no one should be criminally punished except for con-
duct clearly prohibited by the domestic law, 85 and that when in 
defined harboring to be a crime, but which was "neither clear nor . . . helpful" in designating 
the respective punishment for harboring from among "the possible penal consequences Con-
gress may have had in mind." 333 U.S. at 485. The defendant did not pretend that he lacked 
notice that harboring illegal aliens was a crime; he admitted that he knew that harboring was 
unlawful. He argued, instead, that although he had notice as to the nature of the prohibited 
conduct, the courts had no clear guidelines as to the punishment Congress intended and, lack-
ing such guidelines, should not proceed to impose a punishment that Congress did not intend. 
The Court agreed. It invalidated the prohibition on harboring illegal aliens, on the ground 
that the statute was so vague as to the intended punishment that no punishment could be 
imposed without running the risk that the Court would be imposing a sentence that Congress 
did not intend. 
84. Toe so-called "rule of lenity" is often described as merely a rule of statutory construc-
tion, see Busic v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1747, 1753 (1980), but there is also authority that it 
also operates as a constitutional canon of construction. Thus, both the majority of the Court in 
Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432 (1980), and Justice Blackmun in concurrence took the 
position that the Constitution precludes a court from deferring to a lower court construction of 
a criminal statute if the consequence of such "customary deference" causes a court to impose 
punishment the legislature did not "clearly" intend. 100 S. Ct. at 1436, 1439; 100 S. Ct. at 1440 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Moreover, as authority for the proposition that constitutional is-
sues of multiple punishment cannot be resolved without reference to legislative intent, the 
Whalen majority specifically cited Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 82 (1955). 100 S. Ct. at 
1436. The citation to Bell may be significant because, while Bell itself presented no constitu-
tional issue of double punishment, it war the case in which the Court first announced the rule 
of "lenity." Thus, in citing Bell (which was not a double jeopardy case) as authority for the 
proper constitutional analysis of double punishment problems, the Wiza/en Court may have 
been referring to the doctrine for which Bell is best known - the rule of lenity. Finally, in 
explaining why it was inappropriate to defer the lower court's construction of the two statutes, 
the Whalen majority emphasized that defendants have a "constitutional right" not to be "de-
prived of liberty as punishment for criminal conduct" except as "authorized" by the legisla-
ture. 100 S. Ct. at 1437. The Court's emphasis may be significant because, if the lower court's 
interpretation of the statute had been taken at face value, Wiza/en was a case in which the 
legislature had authorized the punishment. This implies that with respect to the interpretation 
of criminal statutes, the Constitution precludes a court from accepting a lower court's interpre-
tation at face value and requires, instead, that the court proceed with caution lest it punish a 
person whom the legislature did not intend to punish. 
85. It may be tempting to assume that no person may constitutionally be punished for a 
criminal offense unless his conduct is prohibited not only by domestic law, but by domestic law 
in a form of a statute (as opposed to a common-law crime). Indeed, the Court has ~uggested as 
much, by stating that principles of separation of powers and due process prohibit the federal 
courts and state courts from punishing persons except to the extent authorized by the legisla-
ture. See Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1436-37 & n.4 (1980). This suggestion is 
troublesome because it implies that common-law crimes (which still exist in nearly thirty 
states) are all unconstitutional, something the Court has never intimated. See United States v. 
Davis, 167 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 849 (1948) (upholding a conviction in 
the District of Columbia for the common-law crime of negligently permitting a prisoner to 
escape); w. LA FAYE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW§ 9, at 61-69 (1972). It is 
more plausible to assume, therefore, that the Wiza/en Court would uphold criminal punish-
ment that was either clearly prescribed by the legislature or so clearly accepted as a common-
law crime that legislative silence can be taken as implicit ratification. In either event, the 
essential principle is that no person should be subjected to criminal punishment unless the 
punishment is based on the kind of broad political consensus that is reflected in explicit or 
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doubt, a court should construe criminal statutes so as to avoid the 
risk of punishing a person for conduct the legislature has not pro-
scribed. 86 
The foregoing analysis finds support in Whalen v. United 
States,87 the most recent of the Court's double punishment cases. 
The defendant in Whalen was simultaneously tried in the District of 
Columbia for the local offense of felony murder (punishable by 
twenty years to life imprisonment) and the lesser included felony of 
rape (punishable by any term up to life in prison). He was convicted 
of both o.ff enses and given consecutive sentences of twenty years to 
life for felony murder, and fifteen years to life for rape. He appealed 
to the D.C. Court of Appeals, arguing among other things that the 
implicit legislative enactment. If this is what the Whalen Court meant, it lends further support 
to the view that the Constitution contains a presumption against multiple punishment, a pre-
sumption that can be overcome only by a clear showing that the domestic law intends it to be 
imposed. 
86. This also suggests a role for the courts under the eighth amendment in reviewing the 
length of criminal sentences. As things now stand, the Court appears to feel caught in the 
dilemma between either abdicatingjudicial review of the length of criminal sentences, regard• 
less of how disproportionate they may seem, or imposing its own subjective views on the states 
by drawing lines where no objective criteria exist. The harshness of the dilemma was the 
dominant theme in Rummel v. Estelle, 100 S. Ct. 1133 (1980), the most recent of the Court's 
constitutional decisions regarding the length of sentences. Und~r Texas law, the defendant in 
Rummel received a mandatory life sentence as a two-time recidivist for having been convicted 
of three separate crimes of larceny. He challenged his sentence, arguing that a life sentence 
was grossly disproportionate and, therefore, cruel and unusual as a punishment for what were 
essentially three nonviolent and "petty" property offenses. The Court approached the case as 
if it had only two choices: either to abstain from all judicial review of the length of sentences, 
or to draw arbitrary lines unsupported by objective criteria. The majority (per Justice Rehn-
quist) responded to the self-imposed dilemma by opting for the former, holding that, in the 
absence of "objective criteria," any "line-drawing" would "merely" reflect the "subjective 
views of individual Justices." 100 S. Ct. at 1140. The four dissenters (per Justice Powell) 
opted for the other horn of the dilemma, taking the view that the Texas sentence was so dispro• 
portionate to the criminal sentences in other states and even in Texas itself, that it ''would be 
viewed as grossly unjust by virtually every layman and lawyer" in the country. 100 S. Ct. at 
1156 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
Significantly, however, there is a way out of the Rummel dilemma, a way that lies down the 
path the Court has followed in Whalen. The Court could have struck down the sentence of life 
imprisonment on the ground that the sentence was so out of line with sentences in Texas and 
elsewhere that the Court could not presume that the Texas legislature intended it to apply to 
"petty property offenses" like Rummel's, leaving it open to the Texas legislature to come back 
and make it clear prospectively that it did intend mandatory life sentences for defendants such 
as Rummel. This solution would appear to satisfy both the majority and the dissenters in 
·, Rummel. It would satisfy the majority because it would take the courts out of the business of 
irrevocably imposing their "subjective" views on the popular branches of government, by giv-
ing legislatures the final say on the length of criminal sentences. Yet it would also satisfy the 
dissenters because it would protect defendants from sentences that the courts believe "virtually 
every layman and lawyer" would consider unjust, by protecting defendants from sentences 
that do not enjoy wide political support. (If the Texas legislature were to respond by reaffirm• 
ing its statute - in the way state legislatures responded to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 
(1972), by re-enacting death penalty statutes - the dissenters in Rummel would presumably 
conclude that they were wrong in believing that the life sentence would be viewed as "grossly 
unjust by virtually every layman and lawyer'' in the country.) 
87. 100 S. Ct. 1432 (1980). 
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combined sentences violated congressional intent by cumulating 
punishments that Congress intended to merge. The Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the conviction, finding as a matter of statutory inter-
pretation that Congress intended the two crimes to be separately 
punishable. The defendant sought further review in the United 
States Supreme Court arguing (1) that Congress did not intend the 
two crimes to be separately punished, and (2) that even if Congress 
did so intend, the imposition of consecutive sentences subjected him 
to double punishment in violation of the double jeopardy clause. 
A majority of the Court, while ruling for the defendant, rejected 
both of the standard arguments usually advanced in the area of 
double i:,unishment. The Court refused to say (as Justice Blackmun 
said in concurrence) that the double jeopardy clause "on!y"88 serves 
to incorporate by reference whatever the legislature intends regard-
ing the calculation of punishment; similarly, the Court refused to say 
( as Justice White said in concurrence) that the case could be decided 
purely on statutory grounds. 89 Instead, the Court based its decision 
squarely on the double jeopardy clause, emphasizing that the double 
jeopardy clause "at the very least"90 precludes a court from imposing 
multiple sentences where the legislature intends a single sentence. 
On the other hand, the Court also refused to say (as the defendant 
said in argument) that the double jeopardy clause defines punish-
ments and sentences independently of legislative intent. Instead, the 
Court emphasized that "the question whether punishments imposed 
by a court after a defendant's conviction upon criminal charges are 
unconstitutionally multiple cannot be resolved without determining 
what punishments the Legislative Branch has authorized."91 
Where, then, did this leave the Whalen Court? What role was 
left for the double jeopardy clause? If the double jeopardy clause 
does not passively incorporate legislative intent by reference, and if 
it does not prescribe independent standards of its own, what does it 
do? The answer is that while the double jeopardy clause prohibits 
the courts from imposing multiple punishment where the legislature 
does not intend it, and while it permits the courts to impose multiple 
punishment where the legislature "clearly"92 intends it, it operates in 
all middle areas as a presumption against multiple punishment. It is 
a constitutional rule of construction that reverses the "customary 
88. 100 S. Ct. at 1441 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis original). 
89. 100 S. Ct. at 1440 (White, J., concurring). 
90. 100 S. Ct. at 1436. 
91. 100 S. Ct. at 1436. 
92. 100 S. Ct. at 1439. 
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deference"93 owed to domestic interpretations of domestic law, re-
quiring, instead, that courts strike down multiple punishments unless 
the domestic law "clearly"94 intends them to be imposed.95 
Now back to the starting question: given the constitutional val-
ues that are understood to underlie the prohibition of double punish-
ment, what effect does the prohibition have on the alleged authority 
of the state to appeal criminal sentences? The answer is that it has 
none at all. The prohibition of double punishment is part of a larger 
constitutional presumption of lenity in the criminal law, a presump-
tion against punishing defendants in excess of the true intention of 
the domestic law. The presumption against double punishment 
serves to protect defendants from receiving multiple sentences where 
domestic intent is less than "clear and unmistakable." Needless to 
say, this rebuttable presumption against multiple sentence has no 
bearing on the authority of the government to appeal a single sen-
tence. When the government appeals a criminal sentence for alleged 
abuse by the sentencing judge, it is not asking the appellate court to 
conjoin a new and complete sentence to the sentence already im-
posed at trial. It is not seeking multiple sentences of any kind at all, 
much less multiple sentences unauthorized by domestic law. It is 
seeking a single, authorized sentence; it is asking the appellate court 
to replace an allegedly abusive sentence with a single lawful one. 
93. 100 S. Ct. at 1436. Justice White, concurring separately, agreed that the lower court's 
determination of legislative intent was "not entitled to the usual deference," but not for the 
constitutional reason stated by the majority. He would have justified disregarding the lower 
court's construction purely on the statutory ground that the lower court had made an egregious 
error in interpreting the statute. 100 S. Ct. at 1440 (White, J., concurring) (citing Pernell v. 
Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 369 (1974)). The majority, in contrast, did not review the lower 
court's interpretation because it thought the'lower court made an "obvious error," Pernell v. 
Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 369 (1974), but because the double jeopardy clause required the 
Court to make an independent determination of legislative intent 100 S. Ct. at 1436. Com-
pare 100 S. Ct. at 1440 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (agree1ng that no deference was owed to the 
lower court, both for the constitutional reason stated by the majority and for the statutory 
reason stated by Justice White). In other words, the Whalen majority reviewed and reversed 
the lower court's interpretation of the District of Columbia statute, not because the interpreta-
tion was in "obvious error," but because it was not so "clearly" correct as to justify the imposi-
tion of multiple punishment. 
94. 100 S. Ct. at 1439. 
95. This view of the double jeopardy clause in the area of multiple punishment - like the 
analogous view of the eighth amendment, see note 86 supra - is not an aberrant notion of 
judicial review. It is part of a broader judgment that the proper function of judicial review is 
not to abstain from the imposition of substantive values (if that is even possible) or to have the 
final say on substantive values, but to articulate substantive values in the context of procedures 
that permit the political branches to have the final say if they feel strongly to the contrary. See 
Tushnet, .Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Harl Ely lo Constitutional 
Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1058-59 (1980) (discussing the" 'suspensive' veto" school of consti-
tutional theory). }1ut cf. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theo• 
ries, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980) (implicitly denying the possibility that the courts can articulate 
substantive values without also having the final say in imposing such values). 
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Accordingly, as long as the government's avenue of appeal is clearly 
authorized by the domestic law, and as long as the appellate court's 
superseding sentence is also authorized, the increase in sentence on 
appeal presents no issues of double punishment. 
This does not mean that the double jeopardy clause necessarily 
permits the government to appeal a criminal sentence. It means, 
rather, that such appeals are not prohibited by either the rule regard-
ing "acquittals," or the rule regarding double punishment, and that 
if such appeals are prohibited by double jeopardy, it must be because 
of some third principle of double jeopardy yet to be discussed. 
C. Finality 
To establish a double jeopardy claim against a government ap-
peal of sentence, a defendant is left to proceed under the third of the 
double jeopardy values - the ever-present interest of a defendant in 
finality. When a defendant challenges a government appeal of sen-
tence, he is not suggesting that the trial judge speaks with such an 
authoritative voice that his sentences should be absolutely final (as 
would be true of the jury's verdict of not guilty). Nor is he sug-
gesting that the substitution of an increased sentence on appeal vio-
lates the intent of the domestic law (as would be true of a multiple 
punishment). He is asserting, instead, that any further inquiry into 
sentence following the sentencing proceeding at trial would cause 
him undue anxiety. Even if the trial judge's sentence is flawed, and 
even if it could be replaced on appeal by a single and lawful domes-
tic sentence, the trial judge's sentence should stand (the defendant 
would say) because any further litigation to correct it would impose 
an undue "ordeal"96 on him. In short, the defendant is relying upon 
what the Supreme Court calls a defendant's interest in "finality":97 
an interest in an end to the "embarrassment, expense and . . . anxi-
ety"98 of criminal prosecution. 
The finality value of double jeopardy is unique in several ways. 
For one thing, it is essentially more indigenous to the double jeop-
ardy clause than its two companion values. The other values of 
double jeopardy are essentially derivative. The prerogative of the 
criminal jury to acquit against the evidence, though enforced 
through the jury acquittal rule of double jeopardy, has its true origin 
96. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). 
97. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion). See also Brown v. 
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977). 
98. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). 
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in the sixth amendment right to trial by jury.99 Similarly, the pre-
sumption against double punishment, though operating through the 
double jeopardy clause, is essentially an aspect of a broader constitu-
tional presumption against punishing defendants in excess of domes-
tic command.100 The finality value, in contrast, is not derivative, but 
originates directly in the double jeopardy clause. Perhaps that is 
what the Court means in saying that the principle of finality is at the 
"heart" 101 of the double jeopardy clause. 
Furthermore, the problems of finality are significantly different 
from other problems of double jeopardy. The difficulty with acquit-
tals and double punishment is to identify the precise nature of the 
constitutional values that underlie the two rules. Once the respective 
99. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199-200 n.50 (1976) (plurality opinion) (to enter a 
judgment of conviction notwithstanding a jury verdict of acquittal, or to retry a defendant 
following a jury verdict of acquittal, would violate both a defendant's sixth amendment right 
to trial by jury and his right not to be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense). To say 
that the double jeopardy guarantee is derivative means that it depends entirely for its scope and 
content on an anterior notion of right to trial by jury. That explains why the government may 
take an appeal from a trial judge's finding of not guilty while not being able to appeal from a 
jury verdict of not guilty: the double jeopardy rules regarding government appeals derives not 
from any notion regarding the finality of a trial judgment, but from a sixth amendment notion 
regarding the finality of jury verdicts. Thus, if the sixth amendment were amended in such a 
way as to eliminate any prerogative in the jury to acquit against the evidence, the double 
jeopardy rules regarding the finality of jury verdicts of acquittal would lose their constitutional 
foundation and, to be coherent, would have to be altered to bring them into line with the rules 
governing the finality of favorable rulings from the bench. Conversely, the sixth amendment 
notions of trial by jury do not depend on preexisting or coexisting rules of double jeopardy. 
Assume, for example, that the federal courts re-embraced the procedural rules by which they 
operated during the first half of the nineteenth century, rules that contain no provision for 
appeals by either the plaintiff or defendants in criminal cases. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D, 
SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 34-35 (2d ed. 
1973). In that event, double jeopardy rules regarding government appeals of jury verdicts of 
not guilty would not exist because there would be no basis for their ever coming into play, Yet 
the constitutional prohibitions on directed verdicts and on other jury-control devices designed 
to prevent a jury from acquitting against the evidence would still operate as fully as ever 
because they derive, not from fifth amendment notions of double jeopardy, but from anterior 
sixth amendment notions of right to trial by jury. 
This insight into the derivative nature of the jury-acquittal rule may also help illuminate 
the nature of the double jeopardy rules against government appeals of a judge's rulings in a 
defendant's favor. Justice Marshall has argued that it violates the due process clause to isolate 
the judge who actually hears evidence from the judge who eventually finds the facts based on 
the evidence. See Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 229-32 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In 
other words, while appellate courts may reverse trial judges for legal errors, appellate courts 
may not reverse trial judges for factual rulings that depend upon trial assessments of demeanor 
and credibility. If Justice Marshall is right, a judge's factual rulings in a defendant's favor, 
which the due process clause requires be final, could not be appealed by the government with-
out also violating the double jeopardy clause. See Cooper, Government Appeals in Criminal 
Cases: The 1978 .Decisions, 81 F.R.D. 539, 549-59 (1979) (suggesting that the Court's recent 
double jeopardy decisions can be rationalized on the ground that trial judges have final au-
thority to find facts). Again, however, if such appeals violate double jeopardy, it is only be-
cause the double jeopardy clause incorporates by reference the due process limitations that 
otherwise apply to the redetermination of factual findings by trial judges in criminal cases. 
100. See notes 82-86 supra. 
101. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 150 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
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values are identified, the rest is easy because there is no dispute 
about the weight the values deserve. The converse is true of finality. 
Problems of finality are difficult, not because of uncertainty regard-
ing the nature of the finality interest, but because of uncertainty re-
garding its weight. Everyone understands the nature of a 
defendant's interest in finality: it is his interest in seeing that crimi-
, nal proceedings against him are brought to an end, "once and for 
all." 102 The real problem is to ascertain how much weight finality 
deserves when finality is juxtaposed (as it almost always is) against 
"society['s] ... valid concern for insuring that the guilty are pun-
ished."103 · 
The task of ascribing weight to finality can be illustrated by refer-
ence to imaginary systems in which the problems of weight are ab-
sent. Imagine, for example, that a system believes that a defendant's 
interest in finality is nearly absolute and, hence, that the prosecution 
should be confined to having a single opportunity to obtain the judg-
ment and sentence it seeks. 104 No court in such a system would ever 
have to weigh or balance a- defendant's interest in finality against 
"the public interest in assuring that each defendant shall be subject 
to a just judgment on the merits of his case,"105 because the defend-
ant's interest would always prevail. Once prosecuted, a defendant 
would be entitled to immunity from reprosecution any time his ini-
tial trial happened to end in a mistrial, whatever the grounds for the 
mistrial. 106 Once convicted, a defendant would be entitled to immu-
nity from reprosecution any time his conviction was reversed on ap-
peal, whatever the grounds for reversal. 107 Once convicted and 
sentenced, a defendant would be entitled to immunity from review 
of his initial sentence, however illegal the sentence might be. 
Now imagine, conversely, that a legal system believes that a soci-
102. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
103. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978). 
104. This was apparently the view accepted by Justice Murphy. See Wade v. Hunter, 336 
U.S. 684, 694 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
105. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 101 (1978). 
106. See note 104 supra. Also, see United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 613 (1976) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (taking the position that a defendant is immune from reprosecution follow-
ing a mistrial, even if the mistrial was declared at his request, if he requested the mistrial in 
response to a government error); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 473 (1964) (Goldberg, 
J., dissenting) (taking the position that a defendant is immune from reprosecution following a 
mistrial declared over his objection whenever the mistrial can be attributed to fault on the 
government). 
107. This appears to be the rule in England, namely that a defendant cannot be retried 
following the reversal of his conviction on appeal. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 
473 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
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ety's interest in "insuring that the guilty are punished"108 is nearly 
absolute and, hence, that society should have a "complete opportu-
nity to convict those who have violated its laws."109 Again, no court 
would have to weigh or balance the state's interest against the de-
fendant's interest in finality, because the state would always win: the 
state would be allowed to retry a defendant - whether following a 
mistrial, reversed conviction, or reversed ruling in the defendant's 
favor - whenever it could show that the defendant's "guilt is 
clear,"110 and, hence, that the prior proceedings did not "end in just 
judgments."111 
The American doctrine of double jeopardy eschews both of the 
aforementioned extremes. The double jeopardy clause represents a 
"balancing" 112 of the defendant's interest in finality against "the so-
cietal interest in [law enforcement]." 113 One must weigh the gravity 
of the state's interest in further prosecution against the magnitude of 
the defendant's interest in finality, 114 while taking into account both 
the potential risks of official abuse115 and the possibility of adopting 
less drastic alternative means. 116 
108. See note 103 supra. 
109. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978). See Downum v. United States, 372 
U.S. 734, 742 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting) (taking the position that a defendant is never im-
mune from reprosecution following a mistrial, even a mistrial declared over his objection, 
unless the mistrial was deliberately engineered by the state for tactical purposes or for pur-
poses of harassment). 
110. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964). 
111. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949). 
112. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978); Finch v. United States, 433 U.S. 676, 
680 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 477 (1973) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). See also Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978); Illinois v. 
Somerville, 41.0 U.S. 458, 469-71 (1973). 
113. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964). 
114. Compare United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964) (state has a great interest in 
being able to retry the defendant, because it has no other alternative for convicting the guilty), 
with Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (state has no substantial interest in putting the de-
fendant through two complete trials, because it could satisfy its interest by giving the juvenile 
court judge authority to make a transfer decision without also giving him the authority to find 
the defendant guilty). In addition, compare Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1976) 
( defendant has no substantial interest in finality regarding the initial proceeding because the 
trial judge at the initial proceeding has no final authority to find him guilty), w,~lt Breed v. 
Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (defendant has a substantial interest in the finality of the first pro-
ceeding because the juvenile judge at that proceeding has final authority to find him guilty). 
See also Westen & Drube!, supra note 58, at 89 n.47. 
I 15. Compare Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973) (where no possibility existed that 
the mistrial was triggered by overreaching), with Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 
(1963) (where a real possibility existed that a mistrial was triggered in bad faith). See also 
Westen & Drube!, supra note 58, at 92-93. 
116. Compare United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975) (where appeal was the only 
feasible mechanism for fulfilling the state's interest in an error free trial), with Breed v. Jones, 
421 U.S. 519 (1975) (where the state had alternative means for satisfying its interests in al-
lowing a juvenile court judge to make a transfer decision for adult trial). 
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The American law of double jeopardy is a product of such bal-
ancing. Thus, although the state may firmly believe it can prove a 
defendant guilty if given another opportunity, it may not retry a de-
fendant following a mistrial declared over his objection if the decla-
ration was capable of being "manipulated . . . to allow the 
prosecution an opportunity to strengthen its case"; 117 nor following a 
declaration of any mistrial or the reversal of any conviction caused 
by deliberate prosecutorial harassment or overreaching;118 nor fol-
lowing a conviction for either exactly the same conduct119 or nearly 
the same conduct, 120 where the second prosecution is based solely on 
the failure of coordinate governments to synchronize their 
prosecutorial decisions; 121 nor following a trial that ultimately termi-
nates in a basic failure of proof.122 The reason for this, the Court 
would say, is that "the State with all its resources and power should 
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual 
for an alleged offense."123 
By the same token, although a defendant may fervently desire an 
end to the ordeal of prosecution, he can be retried following a mis-
trial declared at his request for reasons other than deliberate 
prosecutorial harassment or overreaching; 124 following the reversal 
of a conviction for reasons other than deliberate harassment or over-
reachirig; 125 and following an erroneous dismissal of the charges in 
his favor. 126 The reason for this, the court would say, is "that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause does not guarantee a defendant that the 
Government will be prepared, in all circumstances, to vindicate the 
social interest in law enforcement through the vehicle of a single pro-
117. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 469 (1973). 
118. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976). See also Westen & Drube!, 
supra note 58, at 102. 
I 19. See Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970). 
120. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977). Although the state in Brown attempted to 
reprosecute the defendants for a crime that contained additional elements not included in the 
previous conviction, the Court nonetheless held retrial to be barred. Thus the Court implicitly 
held that once a defendant has been tried and convicted for an offense, he cannot be retried for 
crimes arising out of the same transaction - the "same transaction" being defined, at the very 
least, as crimes so interconnected with regard to proof, that they consist in substantial part of 
elements already put to proof in the previous trial. Accord, In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889). 
See Westen & Drube!, supra note 58, at 160-63. 
121. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 164 n.4 (1977). The same is not true of govern-
ments sufficiently distinct that coordinating their prosecutorial decisions would impose an un-
due burden on them. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 316-22 (1978). 
122. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. I (1978). 
123. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). 
124. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976). 
125. See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). 
126. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978). 
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ceeding for a given offense." 127 In each case, the Court is striking a 
balance between the defendant's interest in finality and the state's 
contrary interest in nonfinality - sometimes favoring the former, 
sometimes favoring the latter. 
To resolve the validity of unilateral government appeals of sen-
tence - indeed, to resolve any constitutional problem of finality in a 
criminal case - one must first extract from the jurisprudence of 
double jeopardy the controlling criteria of finality, and then apply 
those general criteria to the particular issue at hand. The controlling 
criteria, for present purposes, appear to be fourfold. 128 First, in 
weighing a defendant's interest in finality against the state's interest 
in prosecution, the Court gives special weight to the "expense" 129 
and "anxiety"130 entailed in an adversary presentation of evidence 
on the general issue of guilt or innocence at trial. This heightened 
concern for the "ordeal"131 to a defendant of the trial phase of a 
criminal proceeding is evidenced in several places: (a) in the rule to 
the effect that ''jeopardy" (i.e., the personal "risk"132 to a defendant 
that is such as to require the prosecution to "shoulder" the 
"heavy" 133 burden of justifying the termination and recommence-
ment of a criminal proceeding) does not "attach" until the trial phase 
actually begins; 134 (b) in the rule to the effect that ''jeopardy," having 
once attached, comes to some extent to be unattached following the 
completion of the trial phase;135 (c) in the rule that an appellate court 
may reverse a trial judge's finding of not guilty and enter a convic-
tion in its place if the appellate court does so on the basis of the 
record compiled at trial, but not if the appellate court reopens the 
record for de novo fact-finding on appeal; 136 and (d) in the rule that 
127. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 483-84 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
128. An additional criterion, which is not relevant to government appeals of sentence, is 
whether the defendant is being deprived of his interest in being able "to go to the first jury and, 
perhaps, end the dispute then and there with an acquittal." United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 
470,484 (1971) (plurality opinion). See also Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949) (refer-
ring to a defendant's ''valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal"), This 
particular criterion does not apply to government appeals of sentence because the appeal does 
not occur until after a defendant has been heard and judged by the first jury impaneled, 
129. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). 
130. 355 U.S. at 187. 
13_1. 355 U.S. at 187. 
132. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970). 
133. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978). 
134. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978). 
135. See, e.g., United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 (1976) (per curiam). 
136. See Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978). The foregoing statement is not necessarily 
inconsistent with the Court's decision in Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904), In that 
case, the trial court, acting without a jury, had found the defendant not guilty. The Court held 
that the appellate court's reversal of the acquittal had placed the defendant in double jeopardy, 
June 1980] .Double Jeopardy 1039 
the state may subject a defendant to an involuntary two-tiered sys-
tem of fact-finding if one of the tiers is merely a probable cause hear-
ing ( or the other tier is merely an appellate review on the record 
compiled at trial), but not if each tier consists of a full trial on the 
merits. 137 
Second, in weighing a defendant's interests against the state's, the 
Court allows the state to take an appeal from any erroneous ruling in 
a defendant's favor that is otherwise appealable and that can be rem-
edied on appeal without retrying the defendant or reopening the re-
cord.138 This willingness to allow further proceedings on the record 
may be based on the belief that the burdens of an involuntary appeal 
are qualitatively different (and less onerous) than the "personal 
strain" 139 of trial, or because the appellate process is not subject to 
the kinds of prosecutorial harassment, tactical manipulation, and 
overreaching that may occur at trial. Whichever the reason, the state 
may always take an appeal from an erroneous ruling by a judge in a 
defendant's favor, including presumably an erroneous judgment of 
acquittal based on insufficiency of evidence, provided that the appel-
late disposition merely has the effect of reinstating an existing and 
valid jury verdict of guilty; 140 and the state may appeal an erroneous 
finding of not guilty in a trial to the bench if the original trial record 
is such as to permit the appellate court to reverse the trial court and 
enter a finding of guilty without hearing new evidence. 141 
Third, despite its genuine concern for the ordeal of trial, the 
Court allows the state to retry a defendant following the reversal on 
appeal of a judge's erroneous ruling not followed by a jury acquittal, 
Kepner can be justified on one or both of two separate grounds: on the ground that the trial 
judge's finding of not guilty was based on a personal assessment of raw facts of a kind that due 
process precludes an appellate court from reviewing or disregarding on a cold record, see 
discussion of Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Swisher, supra note 99 and discussion of 
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977), infra note 146; or on the 
ground that the trial judge's finding of not guilty was an exercise of a prerogative of nullifica-
tion that the domestic law had vested in trial judges, see Westen & Drube!, supra note 58, at 
132-37. 
137. Compare Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978) (two-tiered system allowed), with 
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (two-tiered system not allowed). 
138. See, e.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978); United States v. Wilson, 420 
U.S. 332 (1975). 
139. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
140. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 n.7 (1978); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 
U.S. 268 (1978). The Court in Scott distinguished United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 
430 U.S. 564 (1977), on the ground that there was no outstanding jury verdict of guilty in 
Martin Linen and, thus, reversal of the trial judge's ruling on sufficiency would have required 
retrial. 437 U.S. at 90, 91 n.7. For further discussion of Martin Linen, see note 146 infra. 
141. See Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978). For a discussion resolving the inconsisten-
cies between Swisher and Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904), see note 136 supra. 
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unless the error was the product of deliberate prosecutorial harass-
ment or overreaching. This is clearly true where a ruling against a 
defendant is reversed on appeal. 142 This is the famous Ball princi-
ple, the principle that distinguishes American criminal procedure 
from systems (such as English criminal procedure) where the state 
may not retry a defendant following the reversal of his initial convic-
tion for lack of a fair trial. 143 Because of its antiquity, and because 
its significance has until recently been masked by the fiction of 
waiver, the Ball principle is only now being recognized for what it is: 
the marking of a fundamental balance between a defendant's interest 
in finality and the state's interest in prosecution. 144 Ball represents a 
basic assessment that even though the state is responsible for deny-
ing a defendant a fair trial the first time around, the state's interest in 
law enforcement is too great to justify immunizing a defendant from 
reprosecution. The state is thus entitled to retry a defendant follow-
ing a tainted trial unless he can show that the taint was a product of 
deliberate harassment or overreaching. The classic statement comes 
from Justice Harlan: 
Certainly it is clear beyond question that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause does not guarantee a defendant that the Government will be 
prepared, in all circumstances, to vindicate the social interest in law 
enforcement through the vehicle of a single proceeding for a given of-
fense. Thus, for example, reprosecution for the same offense is permit-
ted where the defendant wins a reversal on appeal of a conviction. 
United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896) .... The determination to 
allow reprosecution in these circumstances reflects the judgment that 
the defendant's double jeopardy interests, however defined, do not go 
so far as to compel society to so mobilize its decisionmaking resources 
that it will be prepared to assure the defendant a single proceeding free 
from harmful governmental or judicial error. 145 
Significantly, the Court also allows the state to retry a defendant 
following the reversal on appeal of an erroneous ruling by a judge in 
his favor, except where the ruling is followed by a jury acquittal or 
where the ruling represents deliberate harassment or overreaching. 
To be sure the foregoing statement is not entirely consistent with all 
of the Court's recent decisions (because the Court's recent decisions 
are not consistent with one another), 146 but it is the most coherent 
142. See notes ll7-18, 124 supra. 
143. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 473 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); United 
States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). 
144. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 
811-12 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463,466 (1964)), 
145. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 483-84 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
146. See Cooper, supra note 99 (Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978), is inconsis-
tent with United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978)); Westen & Drube!, supra note 58, at 151, 
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principle that emerges from those decisions. 147 It is coherent because 
it corresponds with the established balance of values - ie., the bal-
ance between a defendant's interest in finality and the state's interest 
in prosecution - that underlies the Ball principle. It brings coher-
ence to the jurisprudence of double jeopardy by rendering the two 
lines of cases consistent with one another. It gives the state the same 
right to retry a defendant following an erroneous ruling by a judge in 
his favor as the state now has to retry him following an erroneous 
judgment against him. And it does so based on the premise that 
there is no distinction regarding either the defendant's interest in 
n.304 (Finch v. United States, 433 U.S. 676 (1977) (per curiam), is inconsistent with Swisher v. 
Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978)). 
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977), may also be inconsistent 
with whole lines of cases, depending upon how it is construed. If Marlin Linen means that 
there can never be any further review of an erroneous ruling by a trial judge in a defendant's 
favor if the ruling "represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements 
of the offense charged," 430 U.S. at 571, it is inconsistent with United States v. Ceccolini, 435 
U.S. 268 (1978), holding that the government can appeal such a ruling ifit merely results in the 
reinstatement of an existing and valid verdict of guilty. If Marlin Linen means that there can 
never be any further review of such a ruling ff review would lead to "further proceedings of 
some sort, devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the offense 
charged," United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 370 (1975), overruled, United States v. Scott, 
437 U.S. 82, 87 (1978), it is inconsistent with Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975), 
which holds that the government can appeal such rulings, despite such "further proceedings." 
If Marlin Linen means that there can be no further review of such a ruling if it leads to "fur-
ther proceedings," and ff jeopardy has already once attached, it is inconsistent with United 
States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 (1976), which holds that the government can review such a 
ruling even if it leads to "further proceedings" and even though jeopardy has already once 
attached, provided that the government is not at fault for the way in which the initial proceed-
ing terminated. 
In my judgment, there is only one way in which Martin Linen can be reconciled with the 
surrounding jurisprudence of double jeopardy, and even that way is not entirely satisfactory. 
One can argue that what distinguishes the favorable ruling in Marlin Linen from all other 
"resolution[s] ... of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged" is that the trial 
judge in Marlin Linen was not merely making a legal ruling; he was also making a factual 
ruling. That is, in ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence, he was not simply applying the 
sufficiency standard to the facts as they uncontestedly appeared in the record; he was also 
making some personal factual assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence. If one 
is prepared to assume that that is what the trial judge did, it explains several things. It explains 
why the government could not take an appeal from the ruling on insufficiency: appellate 
courts are simply in no position to review or reverse trial judges for rulings that are based on 
determinations of credibility that do not appear in the record. See discussion of Justice Mar-
shall's dissenting opinion in Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 229-32 (1978), supra note 99; and 
Cooper, supra note 99, at 549-50. It also explains why the double jeopardy clause precluded 
the government from simply retrying the defendant: the prior proceeding had terminated in 
an unreversed (and unreversible) finding that there was insufficient evidence by which the jury 
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The only difficulty with the fore-
going explanation for Marlin Linen is that it conflicts with the general rule that in passing on 
sufficiency of the evidence, federal judges should not make determinations of credibility or 
weight of evidence. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978). Bui see United States v. 
Melillo, 275 F. Supp. 314, 319-20 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). For a further discussion of the foregoing 
explanation, for Marlin Linen, see Westen & Drube!, supra note 58, at 151-54. 
147. To say that the principle is "coherent" means that it harmonizes with the well-ac-
cepted principles that underlie the Court's decisions in related lines of double jeopardy deci-
sions. 
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finality or the state's interest in prosecution that justifies according 
greater finality to an erroneous judge-made ruling in a defendant's 
favor than to an erroneous ruling against him.148 
Finally, the Court does not allow the state to subject a defendant 
to retrial on guilt or innocence if the state's reasons for desiring a 
retrial are both systemic (as opposed to being accidental) and avoid-
able (as opposed to being in necessary furtherance of an important 
state interest). Thus, the state in Breed v. Jones 149 was not allowed to 
subject a juvenile delinquent to a second full trial on the issue of 
guilt or innocence where the second trial was made necessary by a 
bifurcated system in which the juvenile court judge did not decide 
until the end of the first trial whether to make a binding determina-
tion of guilt or innocence or to transfer the case to an adult court for 
trial de novo. The state's reasons for retrying the juvenile delinquent 
in Breed were both systemic and avoidable: systemic, because the 
second trial was a predictable, deliberate, and essentially desired fea-
ture of the state's regime for processing juvenile delinquents; avoid-
able because the state's interest in giving the juvenile court judge an 
option between trying a defendant and transferring him for trial to 
an adult court could have been served by allowing the juvenile judge 
to conduct a separate transfer proceeding in advance of any trial on 
guilt or innocence.1so 
Breed is thus to be distinguished from United States v. Ba/1, 151 
where the second trial was made necessary by the occurrence of 
prejudicial error against the defendant in the first proceeding. The 
basis for the retrial in Ball was accidental (rather than systemic), 
because it was unpredictable, unintended, and undesired. The re-
trial in Ball was also unavoidable, not because the state had any 
necessary interest in committing the error, but because criminal trials 
148. See notes 17-35, 37-40 supra and accompanying text. See Comley, Former Jeopardy, . 
35 YALE L.J. 674, 677-79 (1926); Cooper, supra note 99, at 550, 555; Fisher, Double Jeopardy: 
Six Common Boners Summarized, 15 UCLA L. REV. 81, 83, n.4 (1967); Horack, Prosecution 
Appeals in West Virginia, 41 W. VA. L. Q. 50, 52-60 (1934); Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: 
New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARV. L. REV. I, 8-15, authorities cited at 4 n.11 
(1960); Miller, Appeals by the Stale in Criminal Cases, 36 YALE L.J. 486, 493-97, 504-05 (1927); 
Note, Right of a State to Appeal in Criminal Cases, 49 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 473, 479-82 (1959), 
149. 421 U.S. 519 (1975). 
150. 421 U.S. at 535-41. The evil of the bifurcated procedure in Breed was precisely its 
predictability. If a defendant knows in advance that he may well be subjected to two separate 
and complete trials, he faces a dile=a. If he discloses his whole case in the trial to the 
juvenile judge (and the juvenile judge then transfers the case to adult court), the defendant 
gives the prosecution gratuitous discovery of his case. On the other hand, if the defendant 
withholds his defense from the juvenile judge (and the juvenile judge does not transfer), the 
defendant foregoes his opportunity to put on a defense. This dile=a does not arise when the 
second proceeding is the unanticipated consequence of accidental error. 
151. 163 U.S. 662 (1896). 
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are too elaborate and protective of defendants to be easily adminis-
tered on an error-free basis. 152 The difference between Breed and 
Ball is that retrial in Breed was based on a desired and consciously 
chosen feature of a particular procedural system, while retrial in Ball 
was based on an undesired and unavoidable defect in all procedural 
systems. The difference is that the unanticipated reasons for retrial 
in cases like Ball can never be wholly eliminated as long as criminal 
trials are as complex as they are. 
Now what does this all mean for government appeals of sen-
tence? How do the foregoing criteria of finality bear on the authority 
of the government to unilaterally appeal a defendant's sentence for 
the purpose of increasing the sentence? The answer by now is plain: 
even if one assumes, arguendo, that a defendant's finality interest in 
the length of his sentence is as great as his finality interest in guilt or 
innocence, 153 none of the criteria set forth above weigh against the 
appeal of sentence in JJiFrancesco. The appeal will not necessarily 
result in a repetition of the ordeal of trial because the appellate court 
is authorized to order an increase in sentence based on the record as 
compiled by the sentencing judge, without either taking any new evi-
dence itself or remanding for further fact-finding. 154 This presents 
no problem of double jeopardy, because it is now understood that 
the government may always appeal an erroneous ruling in a defend-
ant's favor ( other than a jury verdict of not guilty), as long as the 
appeal results in an entry on the record of a ruling that was lawfully 
mandated in the first place. 
Moreover, even if the appellate court in JJiFrancesco remands for 
152. As Justice Harlan observed, there is a mutual relationship between the willingness of 
the system to accord defendants complex and rigorous trial rights, on the one hand, and its 
ability to retry him if, perchance, the defendant is convicted as a result of error in the imple-
mentation of those rights. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 {1964): 
From the standpoint of a defendant, it is at least doubtful that appellate courts would be 
as zealous as they now are in protecting against the effects of improprieties at the trial or 
pretrial stage if they knew that reversal of a conviction would put the accused irrevocably 
beyond the reach of further prosecution. In reality, therefore, the practice of retrial serves 
defendants' rights as well as society's interest. 
153. For the suggestion that this assumption is not warranted, see notes 66, 68 supra, and 
175-83 iefra. 
154. The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976), is not entirely clear on this issue. While provid-
ing for the increase in sentence on appeal, § 3576 also stipulates that no such increase shall be 
imposed by an appellate court "except ... after [a] hearinlf' (emphasis added). Although 
"hearing" is ambiguous, legislative history suggests that it refers to an appellate court hearing 
(rather than to a trial court hearing on remand). See Organized Crime Control· Hearings on 
S.30 Before Suhcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 174 
(1970) (statement of Attorney General Mitchell). The former construction is also more sensi-
ble because some increases in sentences - such as the imposition of mandatory prison terms 
or special parole terms in cases in which the trial judge 01nitted them - do not involve discre-
tion or the taking of evidence and would render any further "hearing" on remand in the trial 
entirely superfluous. 
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further fact-finding in connection with an increase in sentence, it will 
do so only where it can show that the trial judge's favorable sentence 
was either "clearly erroneous" as a matter of fact or an "abus[e]" of 
discretion as a matter of law. 155 Again, this presents no problem of 
double jeopardy, for the government should be allowed to retry a 
defendant following an erroneous ruling in his favor for the same 
reasons it may retry a defendant following an erroneous ruling 
against him: in the absence of deliberate harassment or overreach-
ing, "the defendant's double jeopardy interests . . . do not go so far 
as to compel society to so mobilize its decisionmaking resources that 
it will be prepared to assure the defendant a single proceeding free 
from harmful governmental or judicial error."156 
Finally, even if the appellate court in .DiFrancesco were to re-
mand for a new sentencing hearing, the remand would be based on 
events that were both accidental (rather than systemic) and unavoid-
able. The government's appeal in .DiFrancesco was not the product 
of a systemic desire for two sentencing hearings; it was not the prod-
uct of a bifurcated procedure used to enable components of the sys-
tem to work at their best. Nor was the appeal based on a preference 
for two hearings where one hearing would serve the state's interest 
equally well. Rather, the government appeal of sentence in 
JJiFrancesco is an effort to cope with unintended, undesired and un-
avoidable defects in the original sentencing stage. It is an effort to 
cope with errors of the kind that will always occur, regardless of how 
refined a procedural system may be. It is designed to serve a state 
interest that cannot be adequately served by any alternative means. 
The statutory scheme utilizes appellate review of sentences for the 
same reason it resorts to appellate review of convictions: appellate 
review (and remand, where appropriate) is the only feasible mecha-
nism for insuring the integrity and uniformity of sentencing stan-
dards. In short, just as retrial was justified in Ball in response to an 
accidental and unavoidable trial-court error, resentencing is justified 
in JJiFrancesco in response to the comparable error in sentencing 
that was alleged to have occurred there. 157 
155. 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (Supp. 1980). For differences between reversal for "abuse of discre• 
tion" and reversal for "illegality," see note 157 i'!fro. 
156. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
157. Ironically, the best authority for this proposition, Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 
160, 166-67 (1947), is often overlooked because of a misconception as to what an appellate 
court really does when it reverses a sentence for "abuse of discretion." The Bozzo Court held 
that it does not violate double jeopardy for a trial judge to take the initiative in increasing a 
sentence if the increase is "required" in order to replace an "invalid punishment" with a 
"valid" one. 330 U.S. at 167. The United States Court of Appeals in DiFroncesco dis-
tinguished Bozzo on the ground that the original sentence in Bozzo was "invalid," while the 
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II. THREE FACES ILLUSTRATED: North Carolina v. Pearce 
The purpose of the foregoing theory is to bring coherence to the 
jurisprudence of double jeopardy. The ultimate test of its validity, 
therefore, is its usefulness in rationalizing and simplifying complex 
cases. North Carolina v. Pearce158 is such a case, because Pearce not 
only appears to implicate each of the three component values of 
double jeopardy, but does so in the particular context of a defen-
dant's objection to an increase in sentence. Thus, an analysis of 
Pearce will not only cast light on the usefulness of a tripartite theory 
of double jeopardy, but will illuminate the particular issue of gov-
ernment appeals of sentence as well. 
The essential facts of Pearce are simple. The defendant was tried 
and convicted in state court in 1961 for aggravated assault and sen-
tenced to a term of twelve to fifteen years in prison. Four years later 
he initiated post-conviction proceedings which resulted in an appel-
late reversal of the conviction on the ground that evidence had been 
introduced against him at trial in violation of his privilege against 
self-incrimination. Following the reversal of his conviction, Pearce 
was retried, convicted, and sentenced in 1966 to a flat term of fifteen 
years in prison with credit for the some seven years he had already 
sentence in .DiFrancesco was "within that legally authorized." United States v. DiFrancesco, 
604 F.2d 769, 781 n.14 (2d Cir. 1979}, cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1012 (1980). The distinction is 
unpersuasive. The government argues that after finding DiFrancesco to be a dangerous spe-
cial offender, the trial judge abused his discretion under the dangerous special offender statute 
by giving DiFrancesco a sentence for racketeering that was only one year longer than the 
concurrent sentence DiFrancesco was already serving, and that was no longer than the sen-
tence DiFrancesco could have received as a nondangerous and ordinary offender. That is, the 
government argues that the trial judge exceeded :his lawful authority under the dangerous 
special offender statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976), by giving DiFrancesco a sentence that was 
legally insufficient as measured by the statute's aggravated sentencing standards. If the gov-
ernment is correct in its assertion, the trial judge's sentence in .DiFrancesco was just as invalid 
as the sentence in Bozza. A sentence which is the product of an "abuse of discretion" under 
prevailing legislative standards is as unlawful as a sentence which violates the explicit terms of 
a sentencing statute. See generally Greenawalt, .Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Illusive 
Quest far the Fetters That Bind Judges, 75 CoLUM. L. REv. 359 (1975). It makes no difference 
that the alleged sentencing standard in lJiFrancesco is one that must be inferred from the 
dangerous special offender statute by process of statutory interpretation, because once the stat-
ute is so construed, the resulting sentencing standard is just as much a part of the statute as the 
legislative standard in Bozza. Thus, the only difference between the two cases is that the sen-
tence in Bozza was invalid on its face (ie., necessarily invalid, given the sentencing standards 
of the pertinent statute), while the sentence in lJiFrancesco is allegedly invalid as applied, (i.e., 
invalid, given an application of the pertinent sentencing standard to the facts). This distinction 
between facial invalidity and invalidity as applied may be meaningful for some purposes, but it 
is difficult to see why it should make any difference for double jeopardy purposes. Cf. 
Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 101-03 (1914) (in response to a defendant's appeal on 
the record, an appellate court may increase the defendant's sentence on grounds of abuse of 
discretion without violating the double jeopardy provisions of the congressionally enacted 
Philippine Bill of Rights). 
158. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). 
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served in prison. 159 Thus, having originally received a sentence in 
1961 which would have permitted him to have been released on pa-
role after twelve years in prison, Pearce was given a new sentence 
following his retrial and reconviction in 1966 which required that he 
spend a total of fifteen years in prison. He challenged the new sen-
tence, arguing that by increasing his original sentence, the state had 
twice held him in jeopardy for the same offense. The state admitted 
that the second sentence was harsher than the first, but denied that 
the new sentence violated the principles of double jeopardy. 
A. Implicit Acquittal 
One should approach Pearce in the way one approaches all com-
plex double jeopardy cases. One must identify the separate values of 
double jeopardy, ascribe to them their respective weights, and then 
apply the resulting standards to the particular issue in dispute. Be-
ginning with the first of the double jeopardy values, Pearce chal-
lenged the increase in sentence on the ground that it violated the 
prohibition against further prosecution following an acquittal. He 
based the challenge on an analogy to the rule in Green v. United 
States160 that a defendant who is convicted by a jury of a lesser-
included offense, and whose conviction is set aside on appeal, may 
not be retried on the greater offense of which he was "implicit[ly]" 161 
acquitted by the jury. Just as the jury in Green implicitly acquitted 
Green of any greater offense by explicitly convicting him solely of 
the lesser offense (so Pearce argued), the sentencing judge at Pearce's 
original trial should be understood to have implicitly acquitted him 
of any greater sentence by explicitly giving him a sentence of twelve 
to fifteen years in prison. As Justice Harlan stated, agreeing with 
Pearce: 
Every consideration enunciated by the Court in support of the deci-
sion in Green applies with equal force to the situation at bar. In each 
instance, the defendant was once subjected to the risk of receiving a 
maximum punishment, but it was determined by legal process that he 
should receive only a specified punishment less than the maxi-
mum. . . . And the concept or fiction of an "implicit acquittal'.' of the 
greater offense [in Green] applies equally to the greater sentence [in 
Pearce]: in each case it was determined at the former trial that the 
159. The credit of seven years was based on (1) the time spent in jail between the time of 
arrest and the entry of conviction, (2) time served in prison between conviction and the entry 
of the new sentence following retrial, and (3) credit earned for good time. See 395 U.S. at 713 
n.l; State v. Pearce, 268 N.C. 707, 708, 151 S.E.2d 571,572 (1966) (per curiam); State v. Pearce, 
266 N.C. 234, 236-37, 145 S.E.2d 918, 920-21 (1966). 
160. 355- U.S. 184 (1957). 
161. 355 U.S. at 190. 
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defendant or his offense was of a certain limited degree of "badness" or 
gravity only, and therefore merited only a certain limited punish-
ment.162 
The Pearce majority passed over this argument in complete si-
lence, thereby raising a question in some minds as to whether Green 
(and the principle of implicit acquittal) could be satisfactorily distin-
guished from a subsequent increase in sentence. 163 Yet by now the 
distinctions are plain. The controlling difference between the 
favorable original verdict in Green and the favorable original sen-
tence in Pearce - and the reason the former was absolutely final 
and the latter was not - is that Green involved a favorable verdict 
by a jury on an issue of guilt or innocence, while Pearce involved a 
favorable ruling by a judge on a matter of sentence. The reason jury 
verdicts of acquittal are absolutely final is not because they are 
favorable, or because they are thought to be reliable, or because the 
defendant has actually relied on them, or because he should be enti-
tled to rely on them. They are final because any effort to set them 
aside would intrude upon the jury's exclusive prerogative to acquit 
against the evidence. By the same token, the reason why favorable 
rulings by a judge are not absolutely final - and the reason why 
erroneous acquittals and erroneous findings of not guilty by judges 
can be set aside - is that judges do not possess comparable constitu-
tional authority. And even if they did, the authority to acquit 
against the evidence on issues of guilt or innocence would not neces-
sarily attach to determinations of sentence. 164 
In short, the defendant in Pearce fell into the trap that awaits all 
who argue by analogy. He tried to benefit from the result in Green 
by arguing that the two cases were essentially the same, without 
making the effort to root either his own case or Green in the basic 
values underlying the double jeopardy clause. He tried to avoid the 
task of assessing fundamental values by riding piggyback on a deci-
sion which he said was not significantly different from his own. The 
problem was that one can never tell whether two cases are .truly the 
same for double jeopardy purposes without first understanding what 
those purposes are; for one can never know whether one thing is like 
another, or different from it, without first ascertaining the standard 
that determines likeness and difference. Once the standards of 
162. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 746 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). 
163. Four years later, in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973), the defendant made 
precisely the same argument based on Green that was implicitly rejected in Pearce, presuma-
bly because he felt tliat the Court had not fully considered it earlier. Once again, the Court 
rejected it, this time explicitly. See 412 U.S. at 23-24. 
164. See notes 65-68 supra. 
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double jeopardy are identified, it becomes clear that a finding of not 
guilty by a judge is not the same as an acquittal by a jury, and a 
determination of sentence is not the same as a judgment of guilt or 
innocence, because the determining standard is whether the trier of 
fact has the prerogative to acquit against the evidence. The analogy 
of Pearce to Green was fundamentally flawed because di.ff erences 
Pearce took to be trivial were in reality dispositive. 
B. The Prohibition of IJoub!e Punishment 
Turning to the second of the double jeopardy values, the defen-
dant in Pearce argued that his subsequent increase in sentence also 
violated the prohibition of double punishment. He relied for author-
ity on Ex parte Lange, 165 the first and still foremost decision regard-
ing double punishment. The defendant in Lange was tried and 
convicted by a jury for postal theft under a statute making the of-
fense punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year or a 
fine of not more than $200. The trial judge imposed a sentence of 
one year in prison plus a $200 fine. The defendant immediately paid 
the fine and commenced the serving of his sentence. Some five days 
later, after the $200 payment had been deposited to the credit of the 
United States and, thus, had passed irrevocably out of the court's 
control, 166 the sentencing judge vacated the original sentence and 
imposed a new sentence of one year in prison with no credit for the 
five days already served and no provision for reimbursement of the 
fine. The defendant sought relief in the Supreme Court, arguing that 
the subsequent sentence of one year in prison violated the double 
jeopardy clause. The Court, agreeing, held in memorable language 
that by vacating the defendant's original sentence and resentencing 
him to one year in prison, the trial .court punished Lange twice for 
the same offense: 
If there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of England and 
America, it is that no man can be twice lawfully punished for the same 
offence. And though there have been nice questions in the application 
of this rule to cases in which the act charged was such as to come 
within the definition of more than one statutory offence, or to bring the 
party within the jurisdiction of more than one court, there has never 
been any doubt of its entire and complete protection of the party when 
a second punishment is proposed in the same court, on the same facts, 
165. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874). 
166. The Court in Lange assumed that the $200 fine, which had been deposited to the 
credit of the Treasurer of the United States, could not be recalled by the Court and could not 
be returned to the defendant without an act of Congress. See 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 175; 85 U.S. 
(18 Wall.) at 200 (Clliford, J., dissenting). 
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for the same statutory offence. 167 
The defendant in Pearce argued that his case was directly analo-
gous to Lange. Just as the state was prohibited in Lange from vacat-
ing the defendant's original sentence (a $200 fine plus one year in 
prison) and replacing it with a longer sentence (a $200 fine plus one 
year and five days in prison), so, Pearce argued, the state was prohib-
ited in his case from vacating his original sentence of twelve to 
fifteen years and replacing it with a flat sentence of fifteen years. As 
Justice Harlan said in Pearce: 
[l]t has long been established that once a prisoner commences service 
of sentence, the [Double Jeopardy] Clause prevents a court from vacat-
ing the sentence and then imposing a greater one.168 
Not surprisingly, Pearce's analogy to Lange was flawed for the 
same reason as his analogy to Green. It proceeded on the premise 
that the similarities between Lange and Pearce predominated over 
their differences, and yet it failed to root such similarities and differ-
ences in the purposes of double jeopardy. That is to say, the defend-
ant in Pearce tried to argue that the two cases were alike in 
significant ways (and different in insignificant ways) without articu-
lating the double jeopardy standard for determining "likeness" in 
the area of double punishment. Having once identified the control-
ling value, one discovers that Pearce is as different from Lange as it 
is from Green. 
As we have seen, the ban on double punishment is designed to 
prohibit the state from doubling up on what the "law" defines as the 
proper sentence for a given offense, the law being the domestic defi-
nition of offenses and penalties. By that standard, the defendant in 
Lange was a victim of double punishment. He was punished twice 
for a single offense - "twice" being defined by reference to the do-
mestic law's own standards. The domestic law made his conduct 
punishable by either a $200 fine or one year in prison. By imposing 
a fresh one-year sentence without granting the defendant credit for 
the $200 fine already paid, the trial judge effectively sentenced the 
defendant to both a $200 fine and a year in prison. To that extent, 
the judge imposed two penalties where the domestic law prescribed 
only one. Indeed, even apart from the $200 fine, the judge's fresh 
sentence of one year in prison still constituted double punishment 
because it resulted in an effective sentence of one year plus five days 
for an offense punishable by a maximum of one year. By imposing a 
fresh sentence of one year in prison without giving the defendant 
167. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 168. 
168. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 747 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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credit for the five days already served, the sentencing judge "doubled 
up" on the defendant's sentence by causing him to serve five days of 
his lawful one year sentence twice. 
Not so in Pearce. There was no "doubling up" in Pearce. The 
defendant there was not punished in excess of the domestic law, nor 
was he given two penalties where the domestic law prescribed only 
one. His original sentence of twelve to fifteen years was within the 
statutory maximum of fifteen years. His subsequent sentence can be 
stated, alternatively, as either a fifteen-year sentence with credit for 
the seven years already served, or an eight-year sentence without 
credit for the seven years served. In either event, the combined effect 
of the new sentence and the old was fifteen years in prison, the pre-
cise term of the statutory maximum. It would have been double 
punishment if the trial judge had given the defendant a fifteen-year 
sentence without credit for the time served, or if he had given the 
defendant a sentence which, when combined with the time already 
served, would have exceeded fifteen years. 169 Since he did neither, 
169. Interestingly, having reasoned that a defendant is constitutionally entitled to credit for 
time already served if the denial of credit produces a sentence in excess of the statutory maxi-
mum, the Pearce Court went on to hold in a companion case, Simpson v. Rice, 395 U.S. 711 
(1969), that a defendant is also constitutionally entitled to credit even if the denial does nol 
produce a combined sentence in excess of the statutory maximum. As the Court put it, if the 
state violates double jeopardy when it denies a defendant credit in such a manner as to pro-
duce a combined sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum, "the same •.• holds true" 
when the state denies a defendant credit in such a fashion as no/ to exceed the statutory maxi-
mum. 395 U.S. at 718. 
At first glance, the Court appears to have been in error because the two cases are not at all 
equivalent. If the purpose of double jeopardy is to protect the defendants from being punished 
in excess of legislative intent, double jeopardy is not violated by a denial of credit that results 
in a sentence that is well within legislative parameters. Indeed, this would seem to follow from 
the Pearce Court's own recognition that unless statutory maximums are implicated, there is no 
fanctional d!fference between, say, a ten-year sentence without credit for five years already 
served and a fifteen-year sentence with credit for five years already served. See 395 U.S. at 719 
n.14. 
There is, nevertheless, an explanation for the Court's decision that a defendant is entitled to 
credit even where statutory maximums are not implicated. It will be recalled that the trial 
judge in Rice gave the defendant a sentence of twenty-five years in prison without credit for 
the two and one-half years the defendant had already served. 395 U.S. at 714, 716. The trial 
judge may have done so, not because he wanted to give the defendant a functional equivalent 
of twenty-seven and one-half years with credit, but because he assumed that the legislature 
wished him to treat all prior proceedings and sentences in the case as null and void. If the trial 
judge was mistaken in his assumption, he ended up giving the defendant a sentence that ex-
ceeded what the legislature intended him to impose. Hence, absent clear evidence that a trial 
judge intends to deny credit, or absent clear evidence that, in denying credit, the trial judge 
gave the defendant the functional equivalent of the sentence he could and would have given 
the defendant irrespective of any legislative desire to extend credit, the double jeopardy clause 
requires that a defendant be credited with all portions of a sentence previously served. To that 
extent, the requirement of credit is simply an aspect of the broader presumption against pun-
ishing a defendant in excess oflegislative intent, by operating to resolve in a defendant's favor 
all doubts regarding the legislature's views regarding time already served. For further discus-
sion of this point, see Westen & Drube), supra note 58, at 107-11. 
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his new fifteen-year sentence was no more a violation of double pun-
ishment than an original fifteen-year sentence would have been. 
C. Finality 
Pearce was thus relegated to the third and last of the double jeop-
ardy values, viz., the interest in .finality. The interest is easy to artic-
ulate: it is a need for "repose,"170 a desire to know the exact extent 
of one's liability, an interest in knowing "once and for all" 171 how 
many years one will have to spend in prison. The difficulty is not in 
articulating the .finality value, but in weighing it against the state's 
contrary interest in accurate punishment; because, as we have seen, 
the .finality value of double jeopardy must be balanced against the 
state's interest in the "punishment" of defendants "whose guilt is 
clear."172 Unfortunately, the Pearce Court made no explicit effort to 
weigh the two interests or to explain why the state's interest in im-
posing a new sentence should predominate. It simply announced 
that by appealing his original .conviction, the defendant at his own 
"behest" 173 had caused "the slate" to be ''wiped clean."174 To under-
stand what the Court meant by "the slate" having been "wiped 
clean," one must uncover the balance of values that lies concealed 
under the Court's ipse dixit. One must assess the interaction of the 
government's interest in resentencing and the defendant's interest in 
.finality, as they are presented in the context of resentencing upon 
retrial following the reversal of the defendant's original conviction 
upon appeal. 
As a start, a defendant appears to have less of a .finality interest in 
determination of sentence than in the determination of guilt or inno-
cence. This lesser degree of protection is apparently based on the 
belief that a defendant has less of a legitimate interest in the precise 
length of a sentence than in whether a sentence will be imposed at all 
- less of an interest in getting out of prison early than in not going 
to prison at all. Thus, a defendant enjoys more constitutional pro-
tection on the trial of his guilt or innocence than on the determina-
tion of his sentence, 175 and more constitutional protection regarding 
170. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 810 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
171. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
172. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964). 
173. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 721. 
174. 395 U.S. at 721. 
175. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,358 & n.9 (1977) (plurality opinion). See gener-
ally Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARV. L. R.Ev. 821 
(1968). 
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the revocation of his parole than regarding his release on parole. 176 
This differentiation also means that a defendant is assumed to 
have a greater interest in knowing how he stands regarding guilt or 
innocence than how he stands regarding the length of his sentence. 
Thus, almost every state has statutes of limitation that require the 
state to prosecute and try defendants within certain definite periods 
of time; yet many also have indeterminate sentencing statutes that 
permit the state to defer the fixing of sentence for indefinite periods 
of time. 177 By the same token, while the states are under some con-
stitutional obligation to prosecute and try defendants in a timely 
fashion, they have no constitutional obligation to make sentences 
definite within limited periods of time if doing so would frustrate 
reasonable sentencing goals. 178 Thus, the state may give a defendant 
a tentative parole release date, and then postpone it by reexamining 
its assessment of him;179 the state may give a defendant a tentative 
parole release date, and then postpone it by revoking his earned 
good time; 180 the state may fix a definite maximum for a previously 
indeterminate sentence, and then rescind the designated maximum 
by replacing it with a longer determinate or indeterminate term; 181 
the state may release a defendant on conditional probation or parole, 
and then increase the terms of his release by adding to the conditions 
of his release; 182 the state may release a defendant on conditional 
probation or parole, and then increase its duration by adding addi-
tional periods of time. 183 This all suggests that if a defendant has a 
finality interest regarding the length of his sentence, it is less than his 
finality interests regarding guilt or innocence, and, being less, it can 
more easily be outweighed by a countervailing interest on the part of 
the state. 
As for the state, its interest in being able to increase a defendant's 
sentence following reconviction is both greater and lesser than its 
176. Compare Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation), with Green-
holtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1979) (parole release). 
17'?. See generally Prettyman, The Indeterminate Sentence and the Righi lo Treatment, 11 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 7 (1972). 
178. See United States v. Howard, 577 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1978); Burgener v. California 
Adult Auth., 407 F. Supp. 561, 564-65 (N.D. Cal. 1976). Cf. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 86 
(1976) (federal parolee has no constitutional right to a prompt parole revocation hearing). 
179. See, e.g., In re McLain, 55 Cal. 2d 78,357 P.2d 1080, 9 Cal. Rptr. 824 (1960), appeal 
dismissed, 368 U.S. 10 (1961). 
180. See S. RUBIN, LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 350-57 (2d ed. 1973). 
181. See Sturm v. California Adult Auth., 395 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 395 
U.S. 947 (1969); Hayes v. Field, 298 F. Supp. 309 (C.D. Cal. 1969); In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 
418, 503 P.2d 921, 925, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 221 (1972). 
182. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651, 4209 (1976). 
183. See 18 U.S.C. § 3653 (1976). 
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interest in being able to retry him following the reversal of his origi-
nal conviction. When a conviction is set aside on appeal, a defen-
dant is restored to the position of legal innocence he enjoyed before 
trial; unless the state is allowed to retry him, it must set him free 
regardless of what the evidence may show regarding his guilt. To 
that extent, the state's interest in retrying a defendant following the 
reversal of his conviction on appeal is its "valid concern for insuring 
that the guilty are punished." 184 With respect to resentencing, the 
situation is different. If the state were not allowed to increase the 
defendant's sentence following reconviction, it would not be denied 
the power to give the defendant any sentence at all; it would merely 
be confined to the ceiling represented by the presumptively valid 
sentence the defendant received following his original trial. 185 
On the other hand, the state may at times have a greater interest 
in increasing a defendant's sentence than in retrying him. When a 
state seeks to retry a defendant following the reversal of his original 
conviction, it is essentially asking for an opportunity to give the de-
fendant the kind of fair trial that it could and should have afforded 
him the first time; it is asking for relief from the consequences of its 
own error. In contrast, when the state seeks an increase in sentence, 
it is not necessarily acknowledging that it committed an avoidable 
error in setting the original sentence. Rather, it may be seeking to 
take account of sentencing information that was not and could not 
have been available originally. This is particularly true where 
sentences are based on an ongoing reassessment of a defendant's 
progress toward rehabilitation. The very institution of the indeter-
minate sentence is based on the belief that the kinds of information 
needed for the fixing of a release date come to light during the course 
of a defendant's behavior in prison and cannot be known at the time 
of sentencing. Consequently, if the state were not allowed to read-
just a defendant's expected release date from prison, including read-
justments upward, it would be denied the flexibility it needs for 
rehabilitation sentencing, through no fault of its own. 186 
184. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. l, 15 (1978). 
185. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 43 & n.5, 46 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). 
186. See In re McVickers, 29 Cal. 2d 264, 271-72, 176 P.2d 40, 45 (1946) (dictum). To be 
sure, it might be argued that the solution is to give a defendant such a long sentence at the 
outset that no adjustment upwards will ever be necessary, or even possible. This, until re-
cently, was the practice in California, where defendants convicted of major crimes were sen-
tenced for indeterminate terms ofup to life in prison. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1168 (West 1970), 
amended, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1168 (West Supp. 1980). See generally Note, Sentencing 
Criminals in Calffomia - A Study in Haphazard Legislation, 13 STAN. L. REV. 340 (1961). 
This induced some courts to conclude that the problem of upward adjustments in sentence had 
been eliminated, because every sentence was set at such a high maximum - life imprisonment 
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Now what does this all mean for Pearce? What does Pearce nec-
essarily imply regarding the countervailing values of finality and 
prosecution? Essentially, Pearce can be explained in one of two 
ways. The first approach attributes no weight at all to the defen-
dant's appeal of his original conviction, to his retrial, or to his recon-
viction. It approaches the issue without reference to the defendant's 
retrial and reconviction, treating the case as if the state had arbitrar-
ily selected Pearce from other inmates in prison and, after con-
ducting a hearing into his sentence, had increased the sentence. The 
state may increase a defendant's sentence (so the argument goes) be-
cause its interest in obtaining an optimum sentence is so great, and a 
defendant's interest in the finality of his sentence is so small, that the 
state may reexamine sentences whenever it so desires, and, having 
reexamined them, it may increase them whenever the evidence sup-
ports an increase. I 87 
The trouble with the foregoing argument is that it appears to give 
too much weight to the state's interest in resentencing, and too little 
weight to a defendant's interest in finality. A defendant's interest in 
the eventual length of his sentence may be less than his interest in an 
eventual judgment on guilt or innocence, but it is a legitimate inter-
est nonetheless, particularly if he has already fully served the sen-
tence as originally imposed. I88 By the same token, while the state 
-that it could never be adjusted upward, see, e.g., People v. Leiva, 134 Cal. App. 2d 100, 103, 
285 P.2d 46, 49 (1955). In reality, of course, it was a fiction all along to assume that such state 
prisoners were truly serving life sentences. See Sturm v. California Adult Auth., 395 F.2d 446, 
449 (9th Cir. 1967) (Browning, J., concurring). Not only were the very great majority of state 
prisoners released before the expiration of their "life" sentences, but it would have been un-
constitutional to hold all of them in prison for their full lives. See In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 
503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972). Thus, the pretense of a certain sentence of up to life 
was, in reality, a fiction masking the state's desire to postpone the designation of a defendant's 
actual sentence until his in-prison behavior could be studied by the California Adult Author-
ity. 
187. Justice Douglas seems to have attributed this position to the petitioner in North Caro-
lina v. Pearce. See 395 U.S. 711, 736-37 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
188. Justice Harlan assumed in Pearce that the majority would not allow the state to in-
crease a defendant's sentence upon retrial if the increase resulted in remanding to prison a 
defendant who had already fully executed his initial sentence. See 395 U.S. at 749 n.7 
(Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). The assumption may be based on the recognition that 
a person suffers a greater loss of liberty in being remanded to prison for an additional period of 
time than in continuing to be detained in prison for the same period of time. See note 176 
supra. 
It is sometimes said that while the state may seek an increase in sentence before a defen-
dant commences to serve his sentence, it may not seek such an increase after commencement 
of a sentence. See United States v. Durbin, 542 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1976). If this means that the 
state may never seek to increase a partially executed sentence, regardless of how promptly the 
state endeavors to do so, the argument finds no support in the jurisprudence of double jeop-
ardy. See Dunsky, The Constitutionality of Increasing Sentences on Appellate Review, 69 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 19, 29-33 (1978). On the other hand, if it means that the state must 
move promptly with respect to its reasons for seeking an increase, the argument has considera-
ble force. After all, the only reason increases are ever allowed is because the state's interest in 
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has a significant interest in adjusting a defendant's sentence to ac-
cord with his progress on rehabilitation, that does not ~xplain why 
the state wished to reexamine the sentence in Pearce. It does not 
explain why the state of North Carolina wished to readjust only 
some sentences, or why (if it wished to reexamine only some) it se-
lected Pearce's sentence as the candidate.189 Consequently, if the re-
sentencing in Pearce is to be disconnected from the happenstance of 
Pearce's appeal, retrial, and reconviction, it is difficult to justify, ex-
cept on the dubious assumption that a defendant's interest in the 
finality of his sentence is so weak that it must yield whenever the 
state randomly wishes to reexamine his sentence. 
The second argument is connected to the defendant's appeal of 
his original conviction, its reversal, and his retrial. It has the advan-
tage of explaining why the state picked out Pearce from the pool of 
inmates similarly situated and designated him alone for an increase 
in sentence. It also explains why the State of North Carolina, in 
trying to justify its decision to increase Pearce's sentence, argued that 
Pearce "waived"190 his interest in the finality of his sentence by ap-
pealing his original conviction. It explains, too, why the Supreme 
Court implicitly rejected the language of ''waiver" and, yet, rational-
ized the increase in sentence on the ground that Pearce's successful 
appeal had left "the slate wiped clean."191 
To appreciate the connection between Pearce's successful appeal 
and his subsequent increase in sentence, one must understand some-
thing about the two ways in which constitutional rights may be val-
idly relinquished. One way is by direct choice: a defendant has a 
constitutional right to do X - that is, a constitutionally protected 
opportunity to do X without having to suffer certain adverse conse-
quences as a result. He also is allowed (and sometimes even enti-
tled)192 to forego X, as long as his decision to do so is properly 
obtaining an accurate sentence is thought to outweigh a defendant's interest in finality. Ac-
cordingly, if the state moves as promptly as possible in light of its reasons for seeking an 
increase, it cannot be blamed for any resulting delay. This explains both the seven-year delay 
following retrial in Pearce and the even longer periods of delay that occur in the; fixing of an 
indeterminate sentence: each period of delay is unavoidable given the state's reasons for seek-
ing an increase. However, the situation is different if the state is fully able to seek an increase, 
and yet delays its request for long periods of time for no legitimate reason. In that event, the 
unnecessary execution of even a portion of a defendant's sentence may be sufficient to preclude 
the state from seeking an increase. 
189. See 395 U.S. at 736-37 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
190. Brief for the Petitioners at 18-19, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). 
191. 395 U.S. at 721. 
192. It does not follow that because a person has a constitutional right to do X, he must 
also have a constitutional right to waive or forego X. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 
(1965) (a defendant, who possesses a right to a jury trial but would prefer to be tried by a 
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informed. If he makes an informed decision to forego his free op-
portunity to do X, and if the state relies to its disadvantage on his 
decision, he will be deemed to have relinquished X. 193 This is the 
paradigm of waiver. 
The other way of relinquishing rights is by conditioned choice: a 
defendant has a constitutional right to do X'; he also has a condi-
tioned legal right to do B, the condition being that if he does B, he 
foregoes X' as a matter of law. Hence, if the defendant does B, he 
will be deemed to relinquish X', regardless of his state of mind re-
garding X' or his desire to retain X'. The latter is not an instance of 
waiver - it is the paradigm of foifeiture. 194 
The difference between waiver and forfeiture is easily illustrated. 
Consider a defendant who, having both a constitutional right not to 
take the witness stand at his own trial and a constitutional right not 
to answer incriminating questions, 195 decides to testify on his own 
behalf. If he makes a free and informed decision to testify, his deci-
sion will result in his relinquishing both constitutional rights - one 
judge, has no right not to have a jury trial and, indeed, can be compelled to have a jury trial 
over his objection). If a person (who has a right to do X) also has a right to waive or forego X, 
it is either because of the peculiar interests underlying his right to X or because of independent 
constitutional interests having nothing to do with his right to do X. See Faretta v. California, 
422 U.S. 806 (1975) (the right of a defendant to represent himself, and, thus, to waive his right 
to counsel, does not derive from his right to counsel, but from his independent sixth amend-
ment interest in being able to represent himself). 
193. The preclusion results not simply because a person willingly decides to forego X, but 
because the state thereafter relies to its disadvantage on his decision. See Simons, Rescinding a 
Waiver of a Constitutional Right, 68 GEO. L.J. 919 (1980). 
194. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 193-94 (1957) ("Conditioning an appeal of 
one offense on a coerced surrender of a valid plea of former jeopardy on another offense exacts 
afarfaiture in plain conflict with the constitutional bar against double jeopardy.") (emphasis 
added; footnote omitted). Although Justice Black used the term "forfeiture" pejoratively in 
Green to refer to a conditioned choice that was unconstitutional, the term also applies to con-
ditioned choices that are constitutional. See text accompanying notes 201-05 iefra. For a 
general discussion of forfeiture, see Westen, Forfeiture hy Guilty Plea-A Reply, 16 MICH, L, 
REV. 1308 (1978); Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of Consliluliona/ 
Rights in Criminal Procedure, 15 MICH. L. REV. 1214 (1977). 
The foregoing distinction between waiver and forfeiture is more a distinction in emphasis 
than in kind. In each case, a constitutional right is lost because the defendant has taken action 
which has placed himself in a relationship to the state such that its interest in foreclosing a 
right outweighs his interest in asserting it. Thus, in the case of forfeiture, the action consists of 
his doing B; in the case of waiver, the action consists in his causing the state to rely to its 
detriment on his open renunciation ofX. See Westen, Forfeiture hy Guilty Plea, supra, at 1338-
39. In that sense, waivers are simply a subclass of a larger class of forfeitures. See Westen, 
Away from Waiver, supra, at 1260-61. 
195. These two constitutional interests are separate and independent of one another. See 
E. CLEARY, McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE§ 116 (2d ed. 1972). Thus, 
a witness who is not himself on trial as a defendant has a right not to be compelled to answer 
incriminating questions, but no right not to take the witness stand; conversely, a defendant on 
trial for a criminal offense, who has been granted use immunity, has no constitutional right not 
to answer incriminating questions outside the presence of the jury, but he does have a right not 
to take the witness stand in the presence of the jury, 
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by waiver, the other by forfeiture. He will waive his right not to take 
the witness stand because to say that he makes a free and informed 
decision to be a witness at his own trial means that he makes a free 
and informed decision to forego not being a witness at his own trial. 
At the same time, however, he also forfeits his separate right not to 
be interrogated about the subject matter of his testimony because his 
legal right to testify on his own behalf is conditioned on his subse-
quently answering potentially incriminating questions on cross-ex-
amination.196 As the Court says, when a defendant "elects to waive" 
his right not to be a witness by electing to take the witness stand and 
testify in his own behalf, he is then "not permitted to stop, but must 
go on" and "subject" himself to "cross-examination."197 
Notice, again, the distinct ways in which the two foregoing rights 
are relinquished. The defendant loses the right not to take the wit-
ness stand by making a free and informed decision to do the logical 
converse, i.e., to take the witness stand and testify. The defendant 
relinquishes his right not to answer incriminating questions in a very 
different way. He relinquishes it not because he wants to be cross-
examined, or because his decision to take the witness stand logically 
entails being cross-examined, 198 or because he necessarily knows he 
will be cross-examined, but because cross-examination is the price or 
condition of his giving direct testimony. He does not choose to be 
cross-examined; he is made to choose. He does not waive his right to 
be free from having to answer incriminating questions; he forfeits it. 
In addition to possessing different elements, waiver and forfeiture 
are governed by different standards of validity. The validity of a 
waiver (i.e., the validity of a decision to forego X) turns on a defen-
dant's state of mind at the time he chooses· to forego X: the defen-
dant's decision to forego X is valid if, at the time, the decision is 
sufficiently free of adverse consequences to be deemed "volun-
tary'' 199 and sufficiently informed to be "knowing" and "intelli-
196. Once a defendant decides to testify, "[t]he interests of the other party and regard for 
the function of the courts of justice to ascertain the truth become relevant, and prevail in 
the balance of considerations determining the scope and limits of the privilege against 
self-incrimination." 
Jenkins v. Anderson, 100 S. Ct. 2124, 2129 (1980) (quoting Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 
148, 156 (1958)). 
197. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597-98 (1896) (emphasis added). 
198. It would be perfectly conceivable to allow a defendant to take the witness stand in his 
own behalf and to give testimony on direct examination, and yet immunize him from being 
interrogated by the prosecution by means of cross-examination. Indeed, that was essentially 
the practice until recently in Georgia. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961). 
199. To say that an action is "voluntary" means that in addition to being an act of will (as 
opposed to a reflex action), it is free of those pressures on a defendant's state of mind that are 
deemed to be unacceptable as a matter oflaw. For a discussion of the kinds ofpressures,that 
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gent."200 The validity of a forfeiture (i.e.., the relinquishment of X' 
as a necessary condition of doing B) turns on the connection between 
the occurrence of B and the continued existence of X': the forfeiture 
of X' is valid if, as a result of doing B, the defendant has placed the 
state in such a position that its interests now outweigh his counter-
vailing interests in X1.201 
The validity of forfeiture thus depends on the constitutional suffi-
ciency of the change in the state's position. To illustrate such 
changes of position in a double jeopardy context, compare United 
States v. Ba!/202 with Burks v. United States.203 The Ball Court held 
that a defendant, who has already been tried and convicted once, 
forfeits his right not to be retried again by successfully appealing his 
original conviction. Why? Not because the defendant wants to be 
tried; or because he knows he will thereafter be retried; or because he 
could be retried anyway in the absence of a successful appeal; but, 
rather, because his successful appeal deprives the state of the benefit 
of an otherwise valid conviction for reasons that do not justify im-
munizing defendants from reprosecution. In other words, the suc-
cessful appeal in Ball had the inevitable effect of placing the state in 
the same position vis-a-vis the defendant that it occupied before 
Ball's original trial and that it would have occupied had the original 
trial ended in a mistrial declared over his objection for non-manipu-
lable error - that is, a position in which its interest in prosecution 
simply outweighed his interest in finality.204 
In contrast, the Burks Court held that a defendant, who has been 
tried and convicted once and who otherwise cannot be tried again, 
does not forfeit his right not to be retried again by successfully ap-
pealing his original conviction on grounds of insufficiency of evi-
are acceptable (and unacceptable) in the context of the entry of a guilty plea, see Westen & 
Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies far Broken Plea Bargains, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 471, 
477-501 (1978). 
200. To say that an action is "knowing" and "intelligent" means that it is based on the 
kinds of information that the state is required to provide a defendant as a matter of law. For 
the kinds of information that the state is required to provide in the context of guilty pleas, see 
Westen & Westin, supra note 199, at 501-12. 
201. If the state's interests do not outweigh the defendant's, the condition is unconstitu-
tional and the forfeiture is invalid. If the state's interest do outweigh the defendant's, the 
condition is constitutional and the forfeiture is valid. In that sense, forfeiture is the conse-
quence of a constitutional condition. For more on constitutional and unconstitutional condi-
tions,· see O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Al/ached, 54 
CALlF. L. REV. 443, 467-70 (1966); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 13 HARV. L. REV. 1595, 
1600 (1960); Note, Another Laok at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 144, 151, 
156-57 (1968). 
202. 163 U.S. 662 (1896). 
203. 437 U.S. I (1978). 
204. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964). 
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dence. Why the difference between Ball and Burks? Why should 
the grounds for the defendant's successful appeal in Burks have any 
bearing on whether he could be retried? The answer is that the de-
fendant's successful appeal in Burks did not place the state in the 
kind of position - or restore it to the kind of position - that out-
weighed the defendant's interest in finality. The state's interest in 
prosecution is never sufficient to outweigh a defendant's interest in 
finality where reprosecution is simply an effort to improve upon a 
case that failed for factual insufficiency the first time around.205 The 
successful appeal in Burks merely restored the state to the position it 
would have occupied if the trial judge had done his duty and dis-
missed the case for insufficient evidence at trial. The defendant's 
appeal in Burks did not work a forfeiture of his right not to be re-
tried because while it produced a change in the state's position, the 
change left the state in no worse a position than it would have occu-
pied if the trial judge had himself taken the initiative (as he should 
have) and dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. 
Now back to Pearce. As between waiver and forfeiture, Pearce is 
clearly a case of forfeiture. Pearce, by appealing his conviction, did 
not ask to be resentenced; nor did he want to be resentenced. He 
wanted the same thing as the defendant in Ball: he wanted the ap-
pellate court to reverse his conviction and, having reversed it, to an-
nounce that the state's proceedings against him were forever at an 
end. Instead, like the defendant in Ball, Pearce discovered that a 
successful appeal was conditioned on his automatically relinquishing 
his finality interests, whether he wished to relinquish them or not. 
Just as the defendant in Ball learned that a successful appeal was 
conditioned on his being subject to retrial, Pearce learned that a sue-
205. In shon, reversal for trial error, as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency, does 
not constitute a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove its case. . . . 
When [such reversal] occurs, ... society maintains a valid concern for insuring that the 
guilty are punished . . • . 
The same cannot be said when a defendant's conviction has been overturned due to a 
failure of proof at trial, in which case the prosecution cannot complain of prejudice, for it 
has been given one fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it could assemble. . . . 
. • . Given the requirements for entry of a judgment of acquittal, the purposes of the 
[Double Jeopardy] Clause would be negated were we to afford the government an oppor-
tunity for the proverbial "second bite at the apple." 
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1978). 
The situation in Burks - simple insufficiency - should be contrasted with cases in which 
the government's evidence is insufficient after incriminating evidence, erroneously admitted at 
trial, is excluded. In that event, the prosecution may not be at fault for the insufficiency of the 
evidence presented the first time around. See Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 26 & n.9 (1978) 
(reserving the question whether Burks applies in such a situation); United States v. Mandel, 
591 F.2d 1347, 1373-74 (4th Cir. 1979) (ordinarily an appellate court should remand for retrial 
in such a situation). 
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cessful appeal was conditioned on his being subject to retrial and re-
sentencing. 
Significantly, the Pearce Court seemed to recognize that it was 
dealing with forfeiture.206 The Court implicitly rejected the state's 
invitation that it base its decision on the fiction of waiver. It refused 
to pretend that Pearce actually wanted to be resentenced under a 
procedure by which he might receive an increase in sentence. Nor 
did it suggest that a defendant's interest in the finality of his sentence 
is so :flaccid that it must always yield whenever the state wishes to 
reexamine his sentence. Instead, speaking in the language of forfei-
ture, the Court emphasized the connection between Pearce's success-
ful appeal and his subsequent increase in sentence, thus suggesting 
that the state's sentencing procedure was a consitutional conse-
quence or condition of his having taken a successful appeal. As the 
Court said, Pearce could constitutionally be subjected to a possible 
increase in sentence because - whether or not he wanted to be re-
sentenced, and whether or not other defendants could be so resen-
tenced - his successful appeal and reconviction effectively "wiped" 
the "slate ... clean"207 as a matter of law. 
What, then, is the precise connection between Pearce's successful 
appeal and his subsequent increase in sentence? How did the suc-
cessful appeal produce a change in the state's position vis-a-vis the 
original sentence? Why was the change in position so significant that 
the State of North Carolina could resentence Pearce but could not 
resentence other non-appealing defendants who (like Pearce) were 
serving presumptively legal sentences? The answer is that in success-
fully appealing his original conviction, Pearce placed the state in the 
position of having to retry him. In retrying him, the state was forced 
to present a fresh record of his criminal conduct. In reconvicting 
him on the fresh record, the trial judge was forced to say something 
about the consequent sentence. In resentencing Pearce without ref-
erence to his original sentence, the trial judge was able to base his 
206. See notes 190-91 and accompanying text. Indeed, the Court has always been skepti-
cal about speaking the language of ''waiver" to describe the conditioned choices that confront 
defendants in the area of double jeopardy. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 99 (1978); 
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. l, 15 & n.9, 17 (1978); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 
609 n. ll (1976); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343-44 n.l l (1975); Benton v. Mary-
land, 395 U.S. 784, 796-97 (1969); 395 U.S. at 811-12 (Harlan, J., dissenting); United States v. 
Tateo, 377 U.S. 463,466 (1964); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191-92, 197 (1957). See 
also Kepner v. United States 195 U.S. 100, 136 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). When the 
Court does speak of ''waiver," it uses it as a "conceptual fiction,'' North Carolina v. Pearce, 
395 U.S. 7ll, 749 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting), to mask what it has deter-
mined to be a valid forfeiture resulting from a constitutionally conditioned choice. See Price 
v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 n.4 (1970). 
207. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 721. 
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sentence on the fresh record as it then appeared before him. In 
short, the trial judge's interest in being able to impose a fresh sen-
tence on the basis of the probative evidence before him was the same 
interest a court always has in being able to base its current judg-
ments on the probative evidence actually before it. 
The foregoing interest is substantial. Indeed, it is ultimately what 
motivates most opponents of the fourth amendment exclusionary 
rule. The advocates of the exclusionary rule make an argument that 
is difficult to resist. The state cannot honestly object to the exclusion 
at trial of illegally seized evidence (they say), because if the state had 
behaved legally, it would never have possessed the evidence in the 
first place. Thus, the exclusionary rule does no real harm, because it 
merely excludes from trial evidence that would otherwise have been 
absent anyway.208 No, say their opponents. The two positions are 
not equivalent because there is a fundamental difference between ac-
quitting a defendant for lack of probative incriminating evidence 
and acquitting him despite probative incriminating evidence. There 
is a difference between true ignorance and pretended ignorance. Re-
gardless of how the probative evidence comes before a court, one 
cannot ask a court to enter a judgment that it knows is contrary to 
the evidence before it, without imposing real costs on the system. 209 
To be sure, people can reasonably differ as to whether the costs of 
the exclusionary rule are outweighed by its countervailing value, but 
no one can deny the reality of the cost. It is the cost of deliberately 
requiring judges to enter judgments that they know to be false upon 
the evidence before them. Moreover, while Mapp v. Ohio210 may 
stand for the proposition that the cost of requiring the entry of false 
judgments is outweighed by fourth amendment values, Pearce im-
plies that the cost is not outweighed by a defendant's double jeop-
ardy interest in the finality of his original sentence. This is 
significant, because it means that even if a defendant's :finality inter-
est suffices to prevent a court from initiating an inquiry into an other-
wise legal sentence, it does not suffice to prevent a court that must 
impose a fresh sentence anyway from basing the fresh sentence on 
probative evidence actually before it. 
Ultimately, Pearce also means something for .DiFrancesco be-
cause, whichever of the two rationales is adopted, Pearce becomes 
208. See Kamisar, The Exclusionary Rule in Historical Perspective: The Struggle to Make 
the Fourth Amendment More Than 'An Empty Blessing,' 62 JUDICATURE 337, 344 (1979). 
209. See J. KAPLAN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INTRODUCTORY CASES AND MATERIALS 215-16 
(2d ed. 1978). 
210. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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authority for the position that the government may appeal an erro-
neous sentence without violating double jeopardy. If Pearce stands 
for the proposition that a defendant's interest in the finality of his 
sentence is so tenuous that the government may reopen even a valid 
sentence and increase it whenever it so chooses, then it follows that 
the government may promptly move to reopen a sentence which it 
can show to be clearly erroneous and replace it with whatever in-
crease in sentence is necessary to correct the error. Similarly, if 
·Pearce means that a trial judge may increase a presumptively valid 
sentence whenever a defendant's appeal and retrial produces a fresh 
record that now justifies a higher sentence, then it follows a fortiori 
that an appellate court may increase a defendant's sentence on ap-
peal whenever evidence already in the appellate record shows that 
the trial judge's sentence is invalid. In either case, having recognized 
what Pearce implicity says about the relatively light weight of a de-
fendant's interest in the finality of his sentence, one discovers that 
.DiFrancesco is truly an easy case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has a favorite saying about double jeopardy. 
The Court found the saying in a law review article, adopted it as its 
own in Pearce, and has repeated it ever since. The saying is short 
and punchy, and partly true. It goes like this: 
[T]he Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy . . . has 
been said to consist of three separate constitutional protections. [1] It 
protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquit-
tal. [2] It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense 
after conviction. [3] And it protects against multiple punishment for 
the same offense.211 
The foregoing synopsis of double jeopardy is half true, half false. 
Ironically, like all half-truths, it is ultimately more hazardous than: 
an untruth, because the true half tends to mask the false half and, 
disguising it, allows the falsity to work its mischief unnoticed. The 
truth of it is, the double jeopardy clause is comprised of three dis-
tinct principles; and the three principles are connected to the rules 
governing retrial following acquittal, retrial following conviction, 
and multiple punishment. These points are true and significant, and 
211. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (footnotes omitted). The Court 
was relying on an analysis in Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 15 YALE L.J. 262, 265-66 (1965). The 
Court has relied on this three-part analysis ever since. See Illinois v. Vitale, 100 S. Ct. 2260, 
2264 (1980); Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1442 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975). 
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the Pearce Court advanced the jurisprudence of double jeopardy by 
recognizing them. 
The flaw is that by failing to identify the governing values that 
underlie the three rules, the Court has no way of knowing what the 
rules really mean. Consider the prohibition of multiple punishment. 
Every member of the Court appears to agree that the double jeop-
ardy clause prohibits multiple punishment. But because they have 
never collectively focused on the values that inform the prohibition, 
they have no common idea as to what the prohibition itself means; 
and not knowing what they mean by it, they disagree on its applica-
tion.212 So it is, too, for individual justices. Thus, after announcing 
three years ago that double punishment meant one thing, Justice 
Blackm.un now admits that it means something quite different.213 He 
has changed his position, not because he believes double punishment 
should no longer be prohibited, but because he now understands 
what double punishment has really meant' all along. 
The same is also true of the second of the three rules, the prohibi-
tion on retrial following a conviction. By juxtaposing the second 
rule with the first rule (i.e., the rule prohibiting retrial following an 
acquittal), the Court implied that the two prohibitions are of equal 
strength. Yet, in reality, the prohibition on retrial following an ac-
quittal is far stronger because the value giving it meaning is more 
absolute. The prohibition on retrial following an acquittal is based 
on a jury's prerogative to acquit against the evidence, and the prohi-
bition is nearly "absolute."214 The prohibition on retrial following a 
conviction is based upon a weaker interest in finality, and is a prod-
uct of "balancing."215 The reality is that a defendant usually can be 
retried following a conviction (and following most dismissals and 
mistrials), because a state's interest in reprosecution usually suffices 
to outweigh the relatively weak interest of defendants in finality. 
In many ways, however, the most serious problem is the first of 
the three rules - the prohibition on retrial following an acquittal. 
The Court experiences more "confusion,"216 overrules more prior 
212. Compare Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1436-37 (1980) (treating the 
double jeopardy clause as a presumption against punishing a defendant in excess of what the 
legislature may have intended), with 100 S. Ct. at 1442-50 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (treating 
the double jeopardy clause as adding nothing to ordinary rules of statutory construction). 
213. 100 S. Ct. at 1440-41 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (expressing a view of multiple pun-
ishment distinct from the view he expressed in Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 155 
(1977) (opinion of Blackmun, J.)). 
214. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978). 
215. See note 112 supra. 
216. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. I, 15 (1978). See also Sanabria v. United States, 437 
U.S. 54, 80 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (referring to "the Court's continuing struggle to 
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decisions,217 and faces more unresolved issues218 in the field of ac-
quittals than any other area of double jeopardy. The Court's prob-
lem, once again, is that it proclaims a rule without articulating the 
rule's rationale and, not identifying the rationale, has no clear idea 
as to what the rule really means.219 The Court proclaims the ab-
solute .finality of "acquittals" (as opposed to the lesser .finality of 
"convictions"); but because the Court has failed to identify the val-
ues that justify such .finality, it has no way of knowing what kinds of 
judicial rulings qualify as "acquittals" within the meaning of its 
rule.220 
Once the Court understands why acquittals are accorded such a 
high degree of .finality, it will know what distinguishes acquittals 
from other favorable rulings. The one value that seems to justify 
such .finality for acquittals is the value in allowing a jury to acquit 
against the evidence. If that is so, the implications are revealing. It 
means that the only judicial rulings that qualify as acquittals for 
double jeopardy purposes are jury verdicts of not guilty.221 It means 
that the other rulings that are sometimes associated with acquittals 
create order and understanding out of the confusion of the lengthening list of its decisions 
[regarding acquittals] on the Double Jeopardy Clause"). 
217. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978) (overruling United States v. Jenkins, 
420 U.S. 358 (1975)); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. I (1978) (overruling Bryan v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950)); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 348-51 (1975) (overruling 
what many had taken to be the double jeopardy definition of "acquittal" in United States v. 
Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970)). 
218. See, e.g., Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 25 n.7, 26 nn. 9-10 (1978) (reserving three 
separate questions for future consideration). See also Cooper, supra note 99, at 539 ("the 
Court has not yet succeeded in articulating constitutional concepts that are clear enough to 
resolve many of the important questions"). 
219. "The word ['acquittal'] itself has no talismanic quality for purposes of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause." Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 392 (1975). See also Fong Foo v. 
United States, 369 U.S. 141, 144 (1962) (Clark, J., dissenting) ("[t)he word 'acquittal' ... is no 
magic open sesame"). 
220. Significantly, the Court appears to recognize that its experience with government ap-
peals has been too limited and of too recent a vintage to enable it to mark out a definitive 
position. Thus, the Court candidly admits that its initial efforts to define "acquittals" have 
been unsuccessful and that as its experience grows, it considers itself free to correct its mis-
takes. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 84-87 (1978). This process of backing and 
filling can be expected to continue. As Professor Edward Cooper has said, "It is difficult to 
believe that the Court has yet charted the course it will ultimately follow." Cooper, supra note 
99, at 540. 
221. The Court has held that a judge-made ruling in a defendant's favor in the course of a 
jury trial is an "acquittal" for double jeopardy purposes if it is "a resolution, correct or not, of 
some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged." United States v. Martin Linen 
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977). Accord, United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97 (1978); 
Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 71 (1978); Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 30 n,8 
(1977). There are two major problems with the foregoing formulation. First, there is no prin-
cipled reason why a defendant should enjoy a greater degree of finality following a legally 
erroneous ruling in his favor than he enjoys following the reversal of an erroneous ruling 
against him. See Cooper, supra note 99, at 555 (referring to ''the increasingly cogent argument 
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are not acquittals at all, including judge-made findings of not guilty 
in trials to the bench, judge-ordered dismissals in a defendant's 
favor, whether made before, during or after trial, judge-entered 
judgments of acquittal for insufficiency of evidence, appellate rever-
sals for insufficiency of evidence, and determinations of sentence, 
whether by judge or jury. It means, finally, that since they are not 
acquittals for double jeopardy purposes, the finality of these latter 
rulings is governed by some other double jeopardy standard. Not 
being governed by the prohibition on retrial following an acquittal, 
they must be governed by the only standard that remains - the stan-
dard of finality that governs retrials following mistrials and reversed 
convictions.222 
In conclusion, the Court applies two distinct standards of finality 
in double jeopardy cases: a strong standard for "acquittals," a 
weaker standard for convictions. Once one understands the distinc-
tion between the two cases, one realizes that nothing qualifies as an 
acquittal except a jury verdict of not guilty, and that all other rulings 
are governed by the same standards of finality as govern convictions. 
That does not mean that judge-made rulings in a defendant's favor 
are never final. It means that they are no more final than mistrials, 
dismissals, reversed convictions, and :findings of insufficiency of evi-
dence, because for purposes of finality, they are all indistinguishable. 
that the double jeopardy clause should not be read to bar government appeals that rest only on 
matters of law"). See also text accompanying notes 17-35, 37-40 supra, and note 148 supra. 
Second, the foregoing definition of acquittals is inconsistent with the Court's other deci-
sions. If an· erroneous ruling by a judge comes after a jury verdict of guilty, it should be 
appealable for reasons set forth in United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975): reversal on 
appeal will result in the reinstatement of an existing and valid verdict of guilty. If the ruling 
comes before the case is submitted to the jury and in response to a motion by the defendant, it 
should be appealable for the reasons set forth in Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977): the 
initial proceeding terminated at the defendant's request without any showing of bad faith by 
the prosecution. 
222. See generally Westen & Drubel, supra note 58, at 148-55. This explains why the de-
fendant could not be retried following the trial judge's favorable (but "egregiously erroneous") 
ruling in Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962) (per curiam). Although the Court 
treated the trial judge's ruling in Fong Foo as an" 'acquittal [that] was final, and could not be 
reviewed ... without putting [the petitioners] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the 
Constitution,'" 396 U.S. at 143, quoting United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896), it 
should be clear by now that it was not an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes, because it 
was not a jury verdict of not guilty. Yet that does not mean that the judge's ruling was not 
final for double jeopardy purposes. It was final for the same reason as the trial judge's errone-
ous declaration of a mistrial in United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484 (1971) (plurality opin-
ion): because without first obtaining the defendant's consent, the trial judge denied the 
defendant an opportunity "to go to the first jury and, perhaps, end the dispute then and there 
with an acquittal," and he did so for the kind of arbitrary reasons that do not justify subjecting 
a defendant to retrial. See Westen & Drubel, supra note 58, at 149-50. 
